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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the Industrial Commission's decision,

supported by the medical opinions of three specialists in
cardiology, was arbitrary, capricious and without any
substantial support in the record.
2.

Whether Olsen waived the right to appeal on

the issue of medical causation.
3.

Whether Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev.. 736 P.2d

37 (Utah 1987), is controlling authority for this case.

DETERMINITIVE AUTHORITIES
1.

Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev,, 736 P.2d 37

2.

Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613

(Utah 1987).

(Utah 1984).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case;
Douglas R. Olsen (hereinafter "Olsen") alleges that

he is permanently and totally disabled pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 35-1-67 (Repl. 1988).
B.

Jurisdiction, Course Of Proceedings And Disposition
Below;
On February 26, 1988, the administrative law judge

(hereinafter "ALJ") denied Olsen7s claim for permanent total
disability benefits.

(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Order attached as Exhibit "A.")

On March 30, 1988, Olsen

filed a Motion for Review which was denied by a unanimous
decision of the Industrial Commission on June 1, 1988.
(Industrial Commission's Order of Denial attached as Exhibit
"B.")

Olsen then filed a Petition for Review which was denied

by the Utah Court of Appeals.

Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n,
-2-

776 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (attached as as Exhibit
"C").

Olsen then filed a Writ of Certiorari which was

granted on October 26, 1989. Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n.
783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989).

C.

Statement of Facts:
1.

Olsen was employed by Tyger Construction

as a night foreman of a maintenance crew on the Stillwater
Dam project. (R. at 4-5.)

On October 29, 1984, he was required

to move a portable welding machine that had become frozen to
the ground.

(R. at 55-56.)

Shortly thereafter Olsen began

experiencing chest pains and was subsequently diagnosed as
having suffered a myocardial infarction involving the anterior
wall of the heart.

(R. at 56-57, 59.)

Olsen spent four or

five days in a hospital at which time he underwent angioplasty
treatment.

(R. at 61-62.)
2.

Wausau Insurance Companies (hereinafter

"Wausau") paid all medical expenses associated with Olsen's
1984 heart attack.

Wausau also paid temporary total

disability benefits for the period October 30, 1984, through
December 2, 1984.
3.

(R. at 8.)
On December 3, 1984, Olsen was released by

his doctor to return to work with "no limitation
whatsoever."

(R. at 62, emphasis supplied.)
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Olsen returned

to work and was later laid off due to a reduction in work
force.

(R. at 62.)
4.

After a one-month layoff, Olsen was called

back to work as a crane operator.

(R. at 63-64.)

Olsen

worked at this job until June 1985, when he was placed in
charge of the ready-mix concrete operation.

(R. at 65.)

In

this capacity Olsen set up and oversaw three ready-mix
concrete plants.

(R. at 65-67.)

5.
off.

On November 22, 1985, Olsen was again laid

(R. at 73.)

Olsen took this opportunity to take a

vacation in southern Colorado.

He towed his 40-foot vacation

trailer to a friend's farm in Ignatio, Colorado, and
commenced what he described was a relaxing vacation.

(R. at

73-74.)
6.

While on vacation, over ten days after

having been laid off, Olsen suffered a second myocardial
infarction on December 2, 1985.

(R. at 74-75.)

In contrast to

his 1984 heart attack, the second heart attack was officially
diagnosed as a myocardial infarction involving the inferior
left ventricular wall.
anterior wall.

The first heart attack involved the

(R. at 249, 250, 279.)
7.

After requesting benefits for the second

heart attack, Wausau sent Olsen to Dr. J. Joseph Perry,
F.A.C.C., a respected specialist in cardiology.

In his report

dated March 10, 1986, Dr. Perry indicated that Olsen's inferior
-4-

wall myocardial infarction was caused by acute occlusion of a
vessel not involved with the first myocardial infarction.
at 250.)

(R.

From this diagnosis, Dr. Perry concluded that the

two heart attacks were not medically related.
From this, I would definitely state
that there was no direct relationship
between his first myocardial infarction and
the second myocardial infarction fourteen
months later in December of 1985.
Id.

(Dr. Perry's report is attached as Exhibit "D.")

Based

on Dr. Perry's conclusion, Wausau denied liability for the
heart attack that occurred while Olsen was on vacation.
8.

On May 16, 1986, Olsen applied for a

hearing before the Utah Industrial Commission.

(R. at 14-15.)

Olsen alleged that the demands and stress of his employment
in 1985 were precipitating factors that led to his second heart
attack.

(R. at 14.)

He also alleged that the 1985 heart

attack was related to the 1984 heart attack.
9.

(Id.)

Following the evidentiary hearing on

September 16, 1986, the ALJ prepared a Summary of Testimony
which was distributed to all parties.

(R. at 260-263.)

ALJ's Suitimary of Testimony is attached as Exhibit "E.,f)

(The
It is

significant that the Summary of Testimony was admitted into
evidence without objection.

Thereafter, the ALJ referred

Olsen to a medical panel, the chairperson of which was
another specialist in cardiology, Dr. Michael J. Preece.
-5-

(R.

at 3 02, 3 39.)

The Summary of Testimony was given to the

medical panel for its consideration, again without objection.
(R. at 263.)
10.

After reviewing the Summary of Testimony and

all of the medical records, Dr. Preece specifically noted
numerous positive risk factors that likely caused Olsen's heart
attacks.

(R. at 280.)

The positive risk factors identified by

Dr. Preece include: (1) a family history of heart attacks
(Olsen's father had three heart attacks in his 40's and died
from a heart attack at age 56); (2) a family history of
diabetes (his father had and two brothers have diabetes); (3) a
family history of high blood pressure (both Olsen and his
mother have high blood pressure); (4) a personal history of
smoking approximately one pack of cigarettes per day since age
16; (5) high blood cholesterol levels; and (6) elevated LDL and
triglyceride levels.

11.

(R. at 85-90, 186, 249, 262-263, 279-280.)

The medical panel found that Olsen's 1984

heart attack was due to "progressive atherosclerotic blockage
of the coronary artery."

(R. at 281.)

The medical panel

concluded that Olsen's 1984 heart attack "was simply due to
the combination of predisposing factors which he had at the
time [and] would not attribute any causative role to any
physical work which [Olsen] was doing at the time."
(Emphasis supplied.)

-6-

Id.

12.

The medical panel also found no causal

connection between Olsen's 1985 heart attack and the 1984 heart
attack.

Id.

Rather, the medical panel found that the 1985

heart attack was caused by Olsen's premature preexisting
arteriolosclerosis.

Id.

is attached as Exhibit
13.

(A copy of the medical panel report

fl

F.M)

Before the medical panel report was admitted

into evidence, Olsen's counsel filed an Objection to the
Medical Panel Report to highlight the contrary medical opinion
given by Olsen's personal physician, a general practitioner
from Colorado.

(R. at 289.)

At that time, Olsen's counsel

waived a hearing on the Objection and acknowledged, in writing,
that the ALJ is the final finder of fact:
I feel that no useful purpose would be
served by a hearing on these Objections to
the Medical Panel Report would serve any
useful purpose [sic]. I am certain that
Dr. Preece would simply restate his
position and Dr. Davidson, hers. I feel
that the administrative law judge is fully
capable of separating out the various
medical and legal problems involved and a
fair decision made [sic].
(R. at 293, emphasis supplied.)
14.

In his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law

and Order, the ALJ specifically noted that the medical evidence
presented by Olsen conflicted with Dr. Preece's medical
panel report and the evidence presented by Dr. Perry.

-7-

(R. at

302-303.)

The ALJ also noted that the 1984 heart attack

involved an acute anterior wall myocardial infarction,
whereas the 1985 heart attack involved the inferior wall.
(R. at 306.)

The ALJ concluded that Olsen had not sustained

his burden of proving that his disabilities were the result of
or caused by the work activities performed at Tyger
Construction:
Based on the findings of the medical panel
and the preponderance of medical
evidence, and considering the applicant's
risk factors for heart disease, I
conclude that he has not satisfied the
medical causation requirement of the
Allen accident test. Accordingly, the
applicant's claim must be denied.
(R. at 306, emphasis supplied.)
15.
Review.

Olsen subsequently filed a Motion for

(R. at 310.)

Contrary to the position he now asserts,

it is significant that Olsen conceded the issue of medical
causation in his Motion for Review:
With reference to the relationship between
the event of November 1985 being related to
the myocardial infarction of October 1984,
Applicant concedes that there is no
medical connection.
(R. at 320, emphasis supplied.) (A copy of Olsen's Motion for
Review is attached as Exhibit "G.")

-8-

16•

In its Order Denying Olsen's Motion for

Review, the Industrial Commission found the only issue was
whether the ALJ had correctly determined that there was no
medical causation under the Allen accident test.

(R. at

339.)
17.

Olsen then filed a Petition for Review with

the Utah Court of Appeals which unanimously affirmed the
decision of the Industrial Commission, holding that "there was
competent, comprehensive medical evidence in the record upon
which the Commission could rely in concluding that petitioner's
heart attacks were not medically related to his employment
activities . . . ."
18.

Olsen, 776 P.2d at 940.

On October 26, 1989, Olsen7s Petition for

Writ of Certiorari was granted by this court.

Olsen, 783

P.2d 53 (Utah 1989).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

To Prevail on This Appeal, Olsen Must Demonstrate
That There is No Substantial Medical Evidence in Support
of the Industrial Commissions Decision Regarding Medical
Causation.
To be entitled to workers7 compensation benefits

Olsen must prove: (1) the existence of an accident;
(2) legal causation; and (3) medical causation.
Industrial Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
case involves only medical causation —
-9-

Allen v.

The present

i.e., the requisite

connection between Olsen's work activities and his myocardial
infarctions.
Medical causation was the primary issue addressed by
the ALJ:
I conclude that [Olsen] has not satisfied
the medical causation requirement of the
Allen accident test. Accordingly, the
applicant's claim must be denied.
(R. at 302-303, 306.)

This was also the only issue decided by

the Industrial Commission:
The Commission finds that the only issue on
review is whether the Administrative Law
Judge correctly determined that there is
insufficient evidence to support a finding
of medical causation.
(R. at 339.)

Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed

this issue in its review of the Industrial Commission's
decision:
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly
stated that where the medical evidence is
conflicting, "it is the responsibility of
the administrative law judge to resolve
factual conflicts." Lancaster v.
Gilbert Dev.. 736 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah
1987) . Moreover, we do not deem the
Commission's findings arbitrary and
capricious "simply because the Commission
adopted the findings of the [medical] panel
rather than those of the independent
physicians. . . . " Rekward v.
Industrial Comm'n 755 P.2d 166, 168
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Accordingly, we find
there was competent, comprehensive medical
-10-

evidence in the record upon which the
Commission could rely in concluding that
[Olsen's] heart attacks were not medically
related to his employment activities . . . .
Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n. 776 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
In light of the finding below that Olsen failed to
establish medical causation, it is significant that Olsen's
Brief does not directly address this issue.

Instead, Olsen

attacks the credibility of the medical panel chairperson and
claims that the Industrial Commission (not the ALJ) improperly
granted deference and abdicated its responsibilities to the
medical panel.

Even if respondents were to concede the

complete validity of Olsen7s arguments (which respondents do
not), Olsen still carries the burden of establishing that his
employment activities were medically related to his heart
attacks.

Because this court must apply a very deferential

standard of review to the medical facts, as found below, the
finding that Olsen failed to establish medical causation must
be affirmed.
B.

Lancaster v. Gilbert Development is Dispositive of this
Appeal.
The administrative law judge has the exclusive

responsibility of weighing conflicting medical evidence and

-11-

determining whether an applicant has sustained his or her
burden of proving medical causation.

Lancaster v. Gilbert

Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 1987) (attached as Exhibit
"H.")

In Lancaster, the ALJ denied benefits to an employee

under medical and procedural circumstances nearly identical to
those in the case at bar.

As in the instant case, the issue in

Lancaster was whether the employee's work activities caused
his heart attack.

In affirming the ALJ's decision, this court

held:
Although the medical evidence was
conflicting, it is the responsibility of
the administrative law judge to resolve
factual conflicts.
We hold that the Industrial
Commission's conclusion that there was no
medical causal connection . . . is neither
"arbitrary or capricious" nor "without any
substantial evidence to support it." We
therefore affirm the Order of the
Industrial Commission.
Id. at 241.
In the case at bar, the ALJ properly weighed all of
the medical evidence and determined that Olsen had not met
his burden of proving medical causation.

Accordingly, the

holding of Lancaster, in conjunction with the
well-established standard of review for factual findings,
mandates affirmance of the finding of no medical causation.

-12-

C.

Olsen has Waived the Right to Appeal on the Lack of
Medical Causation Between the 1984 and 1985 Heart
Attacks.
Olsen initially argued two theories: (1) that the

1985 heart attack was medically related to the 1984 heart
attack and (2) that the 1985 heart attack is medically related
to his recent work activities.

After the ALJ denied liability

on both theories, Olsen filed a Motion for Review in which he
advanced only the second theory.

In fact, Olsen7s Motion for

Review expressly waived the first theory:
With reference to the relationship between
the [heart attack] of November 1985 being
related to the myocardial infarction of
October 1984, applicant concedes that there
is no medical connection.
(R. at 320.)

Based on Olsen,s concession that "there is no

medical connection" between his 1984 and 1985 heart attacks, he
is now estopped from asserting a contrary position.

Pease

v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984).
Accordingly, the issue of medical causation with respect to the
1985 heart attack, as it relates to the 1984 heart attack, is
not properly before this court.

-13-

D.

The Administrative Law Judge Did Not Grant Deference
or Abdicate His Responsibilities to the Medical Panel.
Olsen's lead argument is that "the Commission erred

in giving deference to the Medical [Panel] Report."
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 9, 10-2 0.) This entire argument relies
upon unfortunate and admittedly inappropriate dicta contained
in the Industrial Commission's denial of Olsen's Motion for
Review.

(R. at 3 39.)
A thorough review of the medical records, the ALJ's

Findings of Fact and the Industrial Commission's Order reveals
without any doubt that the finder of fact —
law judge —
report.

the administrative

did not give deference to the medical panel

Rather, the ALJ painstakingly reviewed all of the

medical evidence and concluded that the element of medical
causation was not established.

Therefore, the finder of fact

did not improperly defer to the medical panel report.
Olsen's argument also takes the Industrial
Commission's Order entirely out of context.

When placed in

proper context, it is apparent that the Industrial Commission
reviewed all of the medical evidence.

Moreover, by finding

that the Industrial Commission took into account all of the
medical evidence, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically
rejected Olsen's present contention that deference was given to

-14-

the medical panel report.

Olsen, 776 P.2d at 940, n. 2

(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

A R G U M E N T S
POINT I

THIS COURT HAS A STRICTLY LIMITED STANDARD OP REVIEW
AND MUST SURVEY THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
The scope of appellate review regarding factual
findings before the Industrial Commission has been described
and interpreted numerous times by this court.

In

Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commission. 67 Utah 174, 246 P.
598 (1926) , this court described the applicable standards of
review as follows:
[When] we are asked to overturn the
findings and conclusions of the Commission
which appear to be in conflict with or
contrary to the evidence, it must be
clearly made to appear to us that the
Commission acted arbitrarily or
capriciously and wholly without cause in
rejecting or refusing to give effect to the
evidence. . . . Any other conclusions
would make this court merely a reviewing
court with power to waive a probative
effect of the evidence . . . . Unless
therefore, it can be said, upon the whole
record, that the Commission clearly acted

1 Because this case was commenced prior to January 1, 1988, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
does not apply See Utah Code Ann Sec 63-46b-22(l) (Repl 1988)

-15-

arbitrarily or capriciously in making its
finding and decision, this court is
powerless to interfere. Such is the
manifest purpose and intent of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. . . . It was
not intended, . . . that this court, in
matters of evidence, should to any extent
substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the Commission.
67 Utah at 181-82, 246 P. at 700, 701.
In Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631
P.2d 888, 889-890 (Utah 1981), Justice Oaks extensively
reviewed the standard of review for findings of fact and
concluded as follows:
The Kavalinakis declaration that the
Commission will be sustained in its
findings of fact unless its action was
"arbitrary or capricious" has been cited
repeatedly as the appropriate standard by
which this court reviews the Commission's
findings of fact. [Footnote omitted.]
•

•

*

Under any of these standards —
Kavalinakis, Kent, or Norris — it is
apparent that this court's function in
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a
strictly limited one in which the question
is not whether the court agrees with the
Commission's findings or whether they are
supported by the preponderance of the
evidence. Instead, the reviewing court's
inquiry is whether the Commission's
findings are "arbitrary or capricious," or
"wholly without cause" or contrary to the
"one [inevitable] conclusion from the
evidence" or without "any substantial
evidence" to support them. Only then
should the Commission's findings be
displaced.
-16-

It is also elementary law in Utah that the reviewing
tribunal shall not weigh the probative effect of conflicting
evidence before the Commission.

Wiseman v. Village

Partners, 589 P.2d 754, 755 (Utah 1978); dinger v.
Industrial Comm'n, 571 P.2d 1328, 1329 (Utah 1977).

In other

words, the reviewing court should not "to any extent substitute
its judgment [upon factual matters] for the judgment of the
Commission."

Kavalinakis. 67 Utah at 184, 246 P. at 701.

The appellate body must also survey the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Commission's findings.
Chadwick v. Industrial Comm'n, 572 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah
1977) . As a corollary to this rule, the reviewing court must
presume that the Commission believed the evidence supporting
its findings.

IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829

(Utah 1978).
In light of the foregoing, the issue on this appeal
becomes whether there is any substantial evidence to support
the ALJ's finding of no medical causation or, alternatively,
whether the ALJ acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

-17-

POINT II
OLSEN'S 1985 HEART ATTACK DID NOT ARISE
OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.
It is undisputed that the burden of proof is on Olsen
to establish that his heart attack occurred as the result of
his employment, and this proof must be shown by a preponderance
of the evidence.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (Repl. 1988).

In Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency. Inc., 606 P.2d 256
(Utah 1980), this court was faced with deciding whether an
employee's accident arose out of and in the course of
employment-related duties.

This court upheld the Industrial

Commission's denial of benefits:
To maintain actuarial soundness and
integrity of workmen's compensation
systems, it is essential that premiums be
collected to cover the risks involved. The
coverage does not, and as a practical
matter, cannot extend to injury done to an
employee wherever and whenever it happens,
but is limited to accidental injuries which
occur in the course of or arise out of the
performance of his duties. [Footnote
omitted.]
*

•

*

[I]f the predominant motivation and purpose
of the activity is in serving the social
aspect, or other personal diversion of the
employee . . . the person should not be
deemed to be in the course of his
employment; and where there is uncertainty
as to the just-stated propositions, that
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[uncertainty] should be resolved by the
Commission as the trier of the facts.
(Id. at 257-258.)
A similar issue was decided in Carnesecca v.
Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove, 688 P.2d 476 (Utah 1984).

In

Carnesecca, the administrative law judge denied benefits
because the decedent was killed in a plane crash after he had
been invited to go elk hunting with his brother-in-law.

In

upholding the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits, this
court indicated that injuries occurring while the employee is
not in the course of his employment are noncompensable:
From the facts found by the lower tribunal
in the instant case, which we must respect
on review if not tortured by indiscretion
of the tribunal, the elk hunt was not
within the course of decedent's employment.
Id. at 477.
Finally, in Black v. McDonald's of Layton, 733
P.2d 154 (Utah 1987), the sole issue being decided was whether
the employee was in the course of his employment when he was
injured while traveling to a recreational activity with fellow
employees.

Id. at 156.

This court again upheld the

Industrial Commission's denial of benefits:
To be embraced within the ambient of
"course of employment," the injury must be
received while the employee is carrying on
the work which he is called upon to perform
-19-

or doing some act incidental thereto. It
must occur within the period of employment,
at a place or area where the employee may
reasonably be, and while the employee is
engaged in an activity at least incidental
to his employment.
Id. at 156 (citations omitted).
The foregoing examples illustrate that Olsen's 1985
heart attack did not arise out of and occur in the course of
his employment at Tyger Construction.

Rather, by his own

admission, Olsen was on a "relaxing vacation in Colorado."
(R. at 73-74.)
days.

(Id.)

Moreover, Olsen had not worked for over ten

Accordingly, Olsen's claim that his 1985 heart

attack was the result of his employment activities remains
2
unsupported.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 15.)

Therefore, the

Industrial Commission's conclusion that Olsen's 1985 heart
attack did not arise out of and occur in the course of his
employment is amply supported by the record and by Olsen's
clear admissions.

Given these uncontroverted facts, the

Industrial Commission's conclusion was neither arbitrary nor
capricious, and, under the applicable standard of review, must
be affirmed.

2. Olsen's Brief states that "[t]he lapse of time between the conclusion of work in November [1985] and
the [1985 heart attack] is not unprecedented." (Appellant's Brief, p. 15.) It is noteworthy that
Olsen makes this statement but does not attack or dispute the administrative law judge's finding that
the 1985 heart attack occurred while Olsen was on vacation in Colorado. (R. at 73-74.)
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POINT III
OLSEN HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL ON
THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION.
In contradiction to the position he took in his
Motion for Review before the Industrial Commission, Olsen
now argues that his 1985 heart attack should be compensable
because it was medically related to his 1984 heart attack.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 14.)

In other words, Olsen argues

that his 1985 heart attack was the medical result of either the
1984 heart attack or the work exertion experienced by Olsen
prior to his 1984 heart attack.
In his Motion for Review, Olsen7s prior counsel
conceded the issue of medical causation with respect to the
connection between Olsen7s 1984 and 1985 heart attacks:
With reference to the relationship between
the event of November 1985 being related to
the myocardial infarction of October 1984,
Applicant concedes that there is no medical
connection.
(R. at 320.)
Because Olsen conceded the issue of medical
causation between the 1984 and 1985 heart attacks, neither
respondents nor the Industrial Commission analyzed this legal
theory.

As such, Olsen has waived his right to raise this
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theory on appeal.

Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d

613, 616 (Utah 1984).
In Pease, an employer was found personally liable
for workers' compensation benefits.

Id. at 614.

A motion

for review of sorts was filed, but no specific errors were
specified or alleged.

Id. at 615.

On appeal to this court,

the employer argued that the Industrial Commission failed to
provide proper notice of hearing.

Id.

The employer also

argued that the Industrial Commission's findings of fact were
insufficient as a matter of law.

Id.

In a unanimous decision, this court held that the
employer's failure to raise these issues in his motion for
review was fatal:
In filing the "Motion for Review" under
§ 35-1-82.53, Mr. Pease had the
obligation to raise all the issues that
could have been presented at that time, and
those issues not raised were waived. . . .
Mr. Pease also argues that the finding
. . . is inadequate . . . However, he also
failed to raise that issue on the Motion
for Review and therefore waived it.
Pease, 694 P.2d at 616 (citations omitted).

See also

Alvin G. -Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Comm'n, 681
P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah 1984); USX Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989).
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Based on Olsen's concession that there was no medical
connection between the 1984 and 1985 heart attacks, he is now
estopped from asserting a contrary position.

Similarly,

because he failed to raise this issue in his Motion for Review,
Olsen has waived his right to raise this issue on appeal.
Respondents respectfully submit that Pease v. Industrial
Commission, 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984), is dispositive of this
appeal with respect to the medical connection between Olsen's
1984 and 1985 heart attacks.

However, to demonstrate that

Olsen's substantive arguments are without merit, the remainder
of respondents7 brief will address Olsen's claims on their
merits.

POINT IV
THE RECORD OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S
CONCLUSION THAT OLSEN FAILED TO SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN OF PROOF
WITH RESPECT TO MEDICAL CAUSATION.
A.

Olsen Has Not Sustained His Burden of Showing a Medical
Connection Between His Work Activities and His Heart
Attacks.
To demonstrate medical causation an applicant must

introduce evidence establishing that the "stress, strain, or
exertion required by his or her occupation led to the resulting
injury or disability."

Allen, 729 P.2d at 27. As illustrated
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below, Olsen has failed to show the requisite medical connection
between his disability and the exertion required by his job.
In his treatise on workers' compensation,
Professor Larson indicates that the failure of a heart attack
claim on medical causation grounds can occur in several ways:
There may be direct physical evidence
. . . . There may be medical opinion
evidence denying the causal connection,
with or without conflicting medical
testimony, and in such cases, under
familiar rules, an appellate court will not
disturb a denial of compensation. Or the
medical testimony on which the claim rests
may be too speculative or weak to meet the
burden of proof. . . . Probably the
commonest reason for defeated claims is
simply the general inadequacy of proof
connecting the injury medically with the
employment.
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.84 (1989) (Desk Ed.)
(footnotes omitted).
At least four doctors gave opinions on the issue of
medical causation.

Dr. Perry's conclusion with respect to

medical causation is succinct and straightforward:
Clearly the inferior wall myocardial
infarction was caused by acute occlusion of
a vessel not involved with his first
myocardial infarction directly.
From this I would definitely state
that there was no direct relationship
between his first myocardial infarction and
the second myocardial infarction 14 months
later in December of 1985.
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(R. at 250.)
Dr. Preece, the medical panel chairperson, also
concluded that there is no causal link between Olsen's 1985
heart attack and the employment exertion experienced by Olsen:
[T]he myocardial infarction of December 2,
1985, was not produced by the myocardial
infarction of October 29, 1984. However,
both myocardial infarctions have a common
causative element, that is the premature
arteriosclerosis which this patient is
unfortunate enough to have.
(R. at 281.)

Dr. Preece also stated that the 1984 heart

attack did not incapacitate Olsen, whereas the 1985 heart
attack did:
Obviously, [the 1984 infarction] produced a
permanent scar or amount of damaged muscle
to his heart. That amount of muscle by
itself was not enough to incapacitate him.
It was only when the second myocardial
infarction occurred in December of 1985,
that he had sufficient muscle damage so
that he is now permanently and
significantly incapacitated.
(R. at 282.)
In spite of what Olsen states in his brief, Dr.
Heuser, the applicant's treating cardiologist from New
Mexico, buttresses respondents' contention that preexisting and
premature arteriosclerosis caused Olsen's heart attacks:
Mr. Doug Olsen is a patient of mine
whom I first saw on 12-5-85. The patient
-25-

had an anterior infarction November 1984
treated in Utah. When he presented a year
later with an inferior infarction,
clearly this was due to arteriosclerotic
coronary disease that was present even
before he was first seen in Salt Lake Citv
[in 1984]. There is no question in my
mind that this arteriosclerotic process was
present at the time of his original
anterior infarction, although his right
coronary artery disease was not as severe
as it was the time of his second
infarction.
(R. at 249, emphasis supplied.)

In other words, Dr. Heuser

believed that the arteriosclerotic disease, which was present
prior to and after both heart attacks, "clearly" caused Olsen's
3
heart attacks.
In contrast, the only doctor supporting the view
that Olsen's 1985 heart attack was medically related to the
employment exertion he experienced in 1984 comes from
Dr. Davidson, a family practitioner.

From a review of Olsen's

Brief, one could get the impression that Dr. Davidson
"unequivocally" supported a finding of medical causation.
(Appellants Brief, pp. 12, 14.)

However, when Dr. Davidson's

entire opinion is placed in context, it is apparent that she,
too, questions the causal relationship:

3 Respondents acknowledge Dr Heuser's March 12, 1986 correspondence to Wausau. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 12.) A careful review of that correspondence, however, shows that Dr. Heuser's
mappropnate legal conclusion does not change the fact that Olsen's 1984 heart attack involved the
anterior wall whereas the 1985 heart attack involved the inferior wall and that Dr. Heuser personally
concluded that premature arteriosclerosis caused Olsen's heart attacks.
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I cannot ascribe a direct causal
relationship, but the second event was
directly related, in fact a recurrence, of
the myocardial infarction that took place
October 29, 1984 [sic]*
(R. at 287, emphasis supplied.)

Note that Dr. Davidson

contradicts herself by stating she cannot ascribe a "direct
causal relationship" between the 1984 and 1985 heart attacks.

After reviewing the foregoing medical opinions, three
of which were rendered by cardiologists, the ALJ determined
that Olsen had not sustained his burden of proving that his
heart attacks were medically caused by his work activities.
The ALJ succinctly summarized the overwhelming medical evidence
as follows:
[T]he medical panel cardiologist
fDr. Preece] found that the applicant's
heart attack of October 29, 1984, was due
to a blockage of his coronary artery due to
a preexisting heart disease, and not due
to any physical work he was performing on
that date. Dr. Heuser, Mr. Olsen's
treating cardiologist in New Mexico, also
indicates that the applicant's heart
attacks of October 29, 1984, and December
2, 1985, were due to arteriosclerotic
coronary disease. . . .
The Administrative Law Judge must
respectfully disagree with Dr. Davidson
[the applicant's family physician] in this
regard, since her foregoing finding is
contrary to the overwhelming medical
evidence contained on [sic] the file. For
example, Dr. Perry. a [third]
cardiologist, found that:
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Clearly the inferior wall myocardial
infarction was caused by acute
occlusion of a vessel not involved
with his first myocardial infarction
directly.
From this I would definitely stated
[sic] there was no direct relationship
between his first myocardial
infarction and the second myocardial
infarction fourteen [sic] months later
in December of 1985.
* * *

Based on the findings of the medical panel
and the preponderance of medical
evidence, and considering the applicant's
positive risk factors for heart disease, I
conclude that he has not satisfied the
medical causation requirement of the
Allen accident test. Accordingly, the
applicant's claim must be denied.

(R. at 302-303, 306, emphasis supplied.)
Given the deferential standard of review outlined
above, the threshold issue governing this entire appeal is
uncomplicated and straightforward:

Is there any substantial

evidence to support the ALJ's finding of no medical causation,
or was that finding entered arbitrarily and capriciously?
Because the finding of no medical causation was unquestionably
supported by ample medical evidence, his conclusion was not
arbitrary or capricious.
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B.

The Finder of Fact Did Not Improperly Grant Deference
to the Medical Panel Report.
In Point I of his Brief, Olsen argues that the

Industrial Commission erred by allegedly giving deference to
the medical panel report.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 9.)

It is

significant that this entire argument centers on dicta
contained in the Industrial Commission's Order denying Olsen's
Motion for Review.

(R. at 339.)

In its Order, the Industrial

Commission stated that it "has in the past maintained a fairly
consistent practice of deferring to the medical panel absent
good reason shown why the medical panel report is insufficient
or biased."

Id.

That isolated quotation, however, takes the

Industrial Commission's Order entirely out of context. A
review of the Industrial Commission's complete Order shows
that the medical opinions of Dr. Preece, Dr. Perry,
Dr. Heuser and Dr. Davidson were each considered.
Thereafter, the Industrial Commission affirmed the finding of
the ALJ as follows:
With the above-listed medical evidence
submitted, the Administrative Law Judge
determined that the medical panel report
should be adopted [because] the
preponderance of the medical evidence was
supportive of the medical panel doctor.
•

*

*

The Commission finds that the only
issue on review is whether the
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Administrative Law Judge correctly
determined that there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of medical
causation. This case is unusual in the
diversity of medical opinion presented.
Several of the doctors who have rendered
opinions regarding the causation issue have
stated conclusions that are exactly
opposite of another doctor. . . . Although
Dr. Heuser and Dr. Davidson make
contrary conclusions, the reasons for those
conclusions are not stated. In contrast,
the medical panel doctor's conclusions are
explained with a listing given of the
numerous pre-existing conditions suffered
by the applicant predisposing him to
cardiac arrest. There appears to be no
good reason to reject the medical panel
report, there being no insufficiency in the
explanation and no bias. Therefore, the
Commission must deny the applicant's Motion
for Review and affirm the Administrative
Law Judge.
(R. at 338-339.)

Based on the Industrial Commission's

thoughtful review of all the medical evidence, it is clear that
the Industrial Commission was unbiased in its decision.
Olsen's first argument also overlooks the proper role
of the ALJ as the finder of fact.

As noted above, the ALJ

adopted what he believed was the "preponderance of the medical
evidence" in finding that Olsen had not sustained his burden
of proving medical causation.

(R. at 303.)

In affirming this

conclusion, the Industrial Commission adopted a summarized
version of the medical evidence as found by the ALJ.
339.)

(R. at

On this appeal, however, Olsen contends that it was

the Industrial Commission that granted deference to the
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medical panel report.

This argument fails because it was the

ALJ as the finder of fact, and not the Industrial Commission as
the reviewing tribunal, who found that Olsen had not
sustained his burden of proving medical causation.

In other

words, the Industrial Commission simply adopted the ALJ's
findings with respect to medical causation.

Because Olsen's

entire argument is directed at the Industrial Commission's
alleged failure to treat equally all medical evidence, Olsen's
first argument fails on its face.
C.

Lancaster v. Gilbert Development Mandates Affirmance
of the Administrative Law Judge's Factual Finding
Regarding Medical Causation.
It is not unusual to have differences of opinion in

heart attack cases.

The case at bar bears this out.

Nevertheless, on appeal, Olsen bears the heavy burden of
demonstrating that the Industrial Commission's decision was
arbitrary, capricious or without support in the record.

That

fact was made extremely clear in the recent case of
Lancaster v. Gilbert Development. 736 P.2d 237 (Utah
1987) .
In Lancaster, this court upheld a decision of the
Industrial Commission denying benefits to an applicant under
medical circumstances nearly identical to those in the case at
bar.

Like the instant case, Mr. Lancaster was suffering

from numerous risk factors making him a likely candidate for a
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heart attack —

on or off the job.

Id. at 238.

Unlike the

instant case, Mr. Lancaster eventually suffered a myocardial
infarction while at work.

Id.

The issue presented for

decision was whether Mr. Lancaster's work activities had
precipitated his myocardial infarction, i.e., medical
causation.

Id. at 239-240.
In support of his contention that his employment

activities had precipitated his heart attack, Mr. Lancaster
proffered the testimony of his cardiologist, Dr. Chanderraj,
and that of the medical panel chairman, Dr. Perry, the same
Dr. Perry as in the present case.

Id.

When asked whether

the altitude, cold and working conditions precipitated
Mr. Lancaster's heart attack, Dr. Chanderraj responded in
the affirmative:
If he had not been working up on that
particular day in the cold atmosphere,
operating the heavy equipment, in spite of
having . . . five days history of chest
pain, he probably would not have sustained
a myocardial infarction.
Id. at 240.

In other words, Mr. Lancaster's physician

indicated that but for the working conditions and exertion
required by his employment, Mr. Lancaster would not have
suffered his myocardial infarction.

Opinions regarding medical

causation do not get much stronger than this.

Mr. Lancaster

also proffered the testimony of Dr. Perry who concluded that
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it was "likely" that the conditions under which Mr. Lancaster
was working aggravated his preexisting heart condition.

Id.

In rebuttal, the insurance carrier proffered the
testimony of its independent medical examiner, Dr. Dituri.
Id.

Dr. Dituri was not a cardiologist, and had not

personally examined Mr. Lancaster.

Id.

Dr. Dituri

indicated that Mr. Lancaster's myocardial infarction was not
due to work exertion, but rather:
due to the normal progression of
arteriosclerotic coronary artery disease
that had been present for several years and
was due to such factors as his smoking, his
hypercholesterolemia, his poorly controlled
diabetes and his prior history of alcohol
abuse.
Id.
Notwithstanding the contrary medical opinions of
Dr. Chanderraj and Dr. Perry, the ALJ chose to adopt the
lone opinion of the insurance carrier's independent medical
examiner, Dr. Dituri.

Id. at 241. Although there was

substantial conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ found that
Mr. Lancaster had not sustained his burden of proving medical
causation.

Id.

On appeal, this court took the opportunity to clarify
the analytical framework developed in Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
at 239.

Lancaster, 736 P.2d

As in the instant case, the issue being reviewed was
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whether the Industrial Commission's actions were arbitrary or
capricious•

Id. at 241.

In affirming the Industrial

Commission's decision, this court held that it was the
exclusive responsibility of the administrative law judge to
weigh the conflicting medical evidence and to determine whether
the applicant had sustained his burden of proof with respect to
medical causation under the Allen analysis:
[T]here is competent and comprehensive
medical evidence in the record upon which
the administrative law judge could rely in
concluding that medical causation was
lacking. Although the medical evidence was
conflicting, it is the responsibility of
the administrative law judge to resolve
factual conflicts.
We hold that the Industrial
Commission's conclusion that there was no
medical causal connection between work
conditions and the claimant's heart attack
is neither "arbitrary or capricious" nor
"without any substantial evidence to
support it." We therefore affirm the order
of the Industrial Commission.
Id.

(Emphasis supplied.)
It is respondents' position that Lancaster v.

Gilbert Development is dispositive authority given the
substantial procedural and factual similarities with the case
4
at bar.
In other words, although the medical evidence
presented in the instant case is, only arguably, somewhat

4. It is puwling but noteworthy that Olsen wholly omits to acknowledge or address Lancaster.
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conflicting, it overwhelming supports the conclusion reached by
the ALJ:
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the
overwhelming preponderance of the medical
evidence on [sic] this file supports the
findings of the medical panel, and
accordingly the objections of the applicant
to the medical panel report are hereby
dismissed.
•

*

*

Based on the findings of the medical panel
and the preponderance of medical
evidence, and considering the applicant's
positive risk factors for heart disease, I
conclude that he has not satisfied the
medical causation requirement of the
Allen accident test. Accordingly, the
applicant's claim must be denied.
(R. at 303, 306, emphasis supplied.)

Therefore, given the

great weight of medical evidence presented by well-respected
cardiologists, the ALJ's conclusion that Olsen failed to
establish medical causation finds ample support in the record.
As such, the Industrial Commission's decision to affirm the
finding of the ALJ was neither arbitrary or capricious, nor
without substantial support.

Lancaster, 736 P.2d at 241.

Given the substantial similarities between the instant case and
Lancaster/ the Order of the Industrial Commission must be
affirmed.
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POINT V
OLSEN'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE CONJECTURAL, WITHOUT
SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, AND NOT GERMANE
TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL.
Respondents herein have tried to place Olsen's
arguments in a workable context•

In Point I, respondents

set forth the applicable standard of review.

In Point II, it

was shown that Olsen's 1985 heart attack did not occur in the
course and scope of his employment at Tyger Construction.

In

Point III/ it was shown that Olsen has waived his right to
appeal on the issue of medical causation.

Finally, in Point

IV, respondents showed that the record amply supports the ALJ's
conclusion that Olsen failed to sustain his burden of showing
a medical connection between his work activities and his heart
attacks.

From respondents' point of view, these four arguments

resolve this appeal.

It is with this background that

respondents now briefly address the plethora of allegations
contained in Olsen's Brief.
In Point I of his Brief, Olsen argues that the
Industrial Commission erred by giving deference to the medical
panel.

With absolutely no support or foundation, Olsen

contends that the medical panel opinion is "not only out of the
mainstream of contemporary medical opinion, but pushes upstream
against the current of accepted medical thought. . . . "
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(Appellant's Brief, pp. 12, 18 & 19.)

Olsen also attempts to

discredit the finding of the medical panel by subjectively
claiming that the medical panel chairperson failed to
understand the questions asked by the ALJ.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp. 6, 12, 13, & 18.)
In response, neither Olsen nor his counsel are
qualified to speak as to what constitutes the mainstream of
medical thought in cases involving myocardial infarctions.

In

addition, it is important that Olsen expressly waived his
right to a hearing on the Objections to the Medical Panel
Report.

(R. at 293.)

Had Olsen requested a hearing, he could

have presented evidence regarding what he now contends is "the
current mainstream of medical thought."

Id.

Presently,

however, there is no evidence in the record on this subject
other than the evidence presented by the three cardiologists.
As such, the opinions of the cardiologists cannot be viewed
with skepticism simply because the ALJ failed to adopt the lone
opinion rendered by Olsen's treating physician.
Olsen's subjective attack of the medical panel
chairperson is similarly without merit.
pp. 6, 12, 13 & 18.)

(Appellant's Brief,

In alleging that the chairperson did not

comprehend the questions propounded to him, Olsen is attempting
to read the mind of the medical panel chairperson and to second
guess what information was considered by Drs. Preece and
Perry.

Not only is such an attack improper, but it is also
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unfounded.

If one reads the entire medical panel report, it is

apparent that the medical panel was fully apprised of Olsen7s
medical history as well as the facts and circumstances
surrounding both heart attacks.

The fact that Olsen does not

agree with the medical panel's conclusions is not reason to
discredit those conclusions, especially in view of the
overwhelming corroborative medical evidence presented by
Drs. Perry and Heuser.

Moreover, it is also inappropriate

to raise this issue for the first time on appeal.

Pease, 694

P.2d at 616.
In Point II of his Brief, Olsen argues that the
Commission erred in reopening the issue of liability with
respect to the 1984 heart attack.

As such, Olsen boldly but

incorrectly concludes that respondents are estopped from
denying liability and that "this Court has the authority to
rule on the evidence that Olsen suffered a compensable
accident on October 29, 1984."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 2 0.)

This argument is blatantly misleading and sidesteps the
5
threshold issue on this appeal —

medical causation.

Even if respondents are estopped from denying
liability, for the 1984 heart attack, Olsen nevertheless must
establish that his present disability is medically related to
5. It is undisputed that Wausau paid benefits for about one month following Olsen's 1984 heart attack.
However, the issue, which Olsen repeatedly fails to address, is whether his current disabilities are
related to the 1984 heart attack — not whether the 1984 heart attack constitutes a compensable
industrial accident.
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the employment exertion experienced in 1984.

The ALJ and the

Industrial Commission rejected this argument.

The Utah Court

of Appeals analyzed Olsen's estoppel argument in depth and
concluded as follows:
Thus, the Commission did not "reopen" the
issue of compensability, but rather
reviewed petitioner's heart attack for the
first time. Accordingly, we review the
Commission's determination with respect to
the 1984 heart attack under the same
standard of review previously set forth in
this opinion, and our conclusion remains
the same — there is substantial, competent
medical testimony supporting the
Commission's conclusion that petitioner's
1984 heart attack was not medically related
to his employment activities.
Olsen, 776 P.2d at 941.

Based on the fact that Olsen has

not met his burden of establishing medical causation, his
estoppel argument is irrelevant.

Therefore, respondents are

not estopped from denying liability for a heart attack
medically unrelated to Olsen's work activities.
In Point III of his Brief, Olsen argues that the
Industrial Commission abdicated its fact-finding
responsibilities to the medical panel.

Olsen, however, does

not state which facts were left to the discretion of, or
impermissibly found by the medical panel.

More importantly,

Olsen did not raise this issue in his Motion for Review
before the Industrial Commission.
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As such, Olsen has waived

his right to appeal on this issue.

Pease v. Industrial

Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984).
It is standard Industrial Commission practice to
submit a summary of testimony to a medical panel to inform the
panel of the factual circumstances of the case.

A review of

the Summary of Testimony in the instant case reveals that it
contains all of the pertinent facts and circumstances
surrounding Olsen's two heart attacks.

Significantly,

Olsen did not object to the Summary of Testimony either after
it was prepared or after the medical panel issued its report.
Accordingly, Olsen waived his right to object to the Summary
of Testimony on appeal.

Further, after reviewing the medical

panel report, it is apparent that Dr. Preece was apprised of
the facts of this case.

Most importantly, the ALJ's finding of

no medical causation was based on the "preponderance of medical
evidence."

(R. at 306.)

In other words, there is substantial

corroborative medical evidence which supports the conclusion of
the medical panel.

Based on the foregoing, Olsen7s argument

that the Industrial Commission abdicated its responsibilities
remains void of any substance.
Finally, Olsen alludes to the argument that the
deterioration of a condition caused by an industrial accident
is also compensable.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 14.)

fully concur in this statement of the law.

However, this

argument again sidesteps the threshold issue —
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Respondents

medical

causation.

In other words, Olsen had the burden to establish

that his present disabilities were caused by the 1984 heart
attack.

The ALJ, the Industrial Commission and the Utah Court

of Appeals rejected this argument.
Olsen's deterioration argument is also without
merit because Olsen was released to return to work without
limitation following his 1984 heart attack.

(R. at 123.)

In

fact, the applicant's treating physician, Dr. Ace Madsen,
stated that he "would unequivocally recommend [Olsen] for
working under any conditions."

(R. at 125.)

In a follow-up

visit on August 6, 1985, Dr. Madsen again stated that the
applicant had fully recovered from the 1984 heart attack:
"[Olsen] is doing very well . . . and is physically
fit. . . . Patient is quite stable and doing very well without
any problems."

(R. at 127.)

Further, Dr. Preece stated that

the 1984 heart attack did not incapacitate Olsen, whereas the
1985 heart attack did.

(R. at 282.)

Based on these opinions,

Olsen failed to establish that his current disabilities were
caused by the 1984 heart attack.
CONCLUSION
With respect to findings of fact, this court has a
strictly limited and deferential standard of review.
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The

question thus becomes whether the finding that Olsen failed
to establish medical causation is arbitrary, capricious and
without any substantial support in the record.
The ALJ found that Olsen's work activities of
November, 1985, were unrelated to the heart attack that Olsen
experienced while he was on a "relaxing vacation in Colorado."
(R. at 73-74.)

Additionally, Olsen7s 1985 heart attack

occurred ten days after his final day of work at Tyger
Construction.

Xd.

Given these undisputed facts, Olsen's

claim that his 1985 heart attack constitutes a compensable
accident is untenable.
The ALJ also found that Olsen failed to sustain his
burden of proof with respect to medical causation.

This

finding was based on the conclusions of well-respected
cardiologists.

Although Olsen presented some conflicting

medical evidence by a family physician, the ALJ adopted what he
believed was the "preponderance of medical evidence."

(R. at

338.)
In Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, this court
held that it was the sole responsibility of the ALJ to weigh
conflicting medical evidence, and to apply that evidence within
the Allen framework.

Therefore, because the ALJ's finding of

no medical causation is amply supported by the preponderance of
medical evidence, the applicable standard of review mandates
affirmance of the decision below.
-42-
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this

*7 ~~ day of

March, 1990.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 86000411

*

DOUGLAS R. OLSEN,

*

Applicant,
VS.

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

TYCER CONSTRUCTION and /or
VAUSAU INSURANCE C0MTA3Y and
SECOND INJURY FUND
Defendants.

*
*
*

AND ORDER

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 16,
1986 at 10:00 a.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Robert J.
Shaughnessy, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were
Attorney at Law.

represented

by

Michael

The Second Injury Fund was represented
Boorman, Administrator.

Dyer,

by Erie V.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the matter was taken under
advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Thereafter, the case was referred
to a medical panel whose report was received by the Commission. The medical
panel report was mailed to the parties. The applicant, by and through
counsel9 filed objections to the medical panel report supported by a report
from the applicant's treating physician. The applicant waived any hearing on
his objections. The applicant's treating physician, a family practitioner,
concluded that the applicant's work activities of October 29, 1984, resulted
in his heart attack of that date. By contrast, the medical panel cardiologist
found that the applicants heart attack of October 29, 1984, WEB due to a
blockage of his coronary artery due to pre-existing heart disease, and not due
to any physical work he was performing on that date. Dr. Heuerr, Mr. Olsen's
treating cardiologist in New Mexico, also indicates that the applicant's heart
attacks of October 29, 1984, and December 2, 1985, were due to
arteriosclerotic coronary disease.
Exhibit
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The applicant's objection to the medical panel report also indicates
that the heart attack of December 2, 1985, was directly related to the heart
attack of October 29, 1984, as found by the applicants treating family
practitioner. Dr. Davidson. The doctor concluded, when asked if the December
2, 1985 heart attack was causally related to the heart attack of October 29,
1984: ~l cannot describe a direct causal relationship, but the second event
was directly related, in fact a recurrence, of the myocardial infarction that
took place October 29, 1984." The Administrative Law Judge must respectively
disagree with Dr. Davidson in this regard, since her foregoing finding is
contrary to the overwhelming medical evidence contained on the file. For
example, Dr. Perry, a cardiologist, fct:nd that:
Clearly the inferior wall myocardial infarction was caused
by acute occlusion of a vessel not involved with his first
myocardial infarction directly.
From this I would definitely stated there was no direct
relationship between his first myocardial infarction and
the second myocardial infarction fourteen months later in
December of 1985.
The panel also found no causal relationship between the heart attack
of December 2, 1985, and the heart attack of October 29, 1984.
The
Administrative
Law
Judge
finds
that
the
overwhelming
preponderance of the medical evidence on this file supports the findings of
the medical panel, and accordingly the objections of the applicant to the
medical panel report are hereby dismissed.
The medical panel report is
admitted into evidence.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Douglas R. Olsen was
April of 1984, to work on the
applicant was asked to become
involved working in a trailer
was then promoted to the night
plant. On this job, he would
night.

hired by Tyger Construction as a laborer in
Stillwater Dam project. In July of 1984, the
the operator of the crushing plant. This job
and working the control board. The applicant
foreman of the maintenance crew of the crushing
work anywhere from eight to twelve hours per

On October 29, 1984, the applicant started working at 6:00 p.m. It
was cold and he had on heavy clothing which was normal for this time of year.
The maintenance crew used portable welding machines as part of their
equipment. These machines would sit outside and would thaw out during the
day, but by the time he reported for work at 6:00 p.m. the machines would be
frozen to the ground. On this date, they had hooked one of the 500 amp
welding machines to a truck and were attempting to move it when they
discovered it was frozen to the ground. The applicant and two other workers
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then took hold of the tongue of the trailer upon which the welding machine was
mounted, and tugged on it with all of their strength. The trailer tongue came
loose, and they then attached it to the truck.
The applicant then went and sat in a pickup, and after approximately
five minutes he felt a pain and some pressure in his left chest. The pain
intensified, and the applicant started to notice that he was sweaty and clarmy
and his left arm started to hurt. He then went to the trailer, and was then
taken to the medical trailer. He was seen by the EKT, and when his condition
did not improve he was taken by ambulance to the Duschene County Hospital.
There he came under the treatment of Dr. Ace Madsen, who advised him that he
was having a heart attack. He was given an injection of Streptokinase. After
his condition stabilized, he was then transferred to the LDS Hospital where he
came under the treatment of Dr. Laser. Dr. Laser arranged for an angiogram,
and Hr. Olsen was given an angioplasty. He was then discharged from the
hospital four or five days later. He returned to the Roosevelt area, and
received follow up care from Dr. Madsen. On December 3, 1984, the applicant
was released by Dr. Madsen to return to work with no limitations. He was paid
temporary total disability for the period October 30, 1984 through December 2,
1984.
When the applicant returned to work, the maintenance was now being
handled by the daytime crew, so Mr. Olsen returned to his job as the crusher
operator. He continued to work in that capacity until December 22, 1984, when
the employees of the crusher were laid off because everything would freeze up
in the crusher.
In January of 1985, the applicant was called back to work as a crane
operator. This job consisted solely of sitting and operating hand controls
inside a crane. The applicant continued this job until June of 1985, when he
was placed in charge of the ready-mix concrete plants. The applicant was in
charge of three plants, and between June and October of 1985, he was working
60 hours per week.
He testified that one of the conveyor belts from the
concrete plant ran to the dam sight and that belt was on a 7 degree angle
running downhill. The belt was approximately a mile long. While walking up
this belt in September of 1985, the applicant started noticing what he thought
was heart burn high in his stomach and low chest area. He would have to stop
and catch his breath for three or four minutes, and he would also take a Turns
or Eolaids and the heart burn would go away. He denied having this heart burn
at a n y other time other than while walking up a conveyor belt. Ha also
indicated that his heart burn became more and more frequent. By Movembar of
1985, the applicant stated that they were working seven days per week working
very long hours, and that they were only getting approximately five or six
hours per night of sleep. Since they exceeded the quota of concrete which had
been set by the company, the entire operation was shut down on lovember 22,
1985. The applicant was then able to leave Altamont and take his 40 foot
trailer to Ignatio, Colorado to a friend's farm. Upon his arrival, he and his
wife relaxed, since there was nothing else to do in the area.
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On December 2, 1985, at approximately 6:00 a.m., the applicant woke
up with a severe case of heartburn. The heart burn went all the way to the
roof of his mouth and after taking some medication, he noticed no
improvement. He then roused his wife and she took him to the Mercy Medical
Center in Durango, Colorado where he was treated by Dr. Wilson. The applicant
was placed in the ICCU for approximately a week and was also given a double
dose of Streptokinase, but with no improvement. While his doctor was treating
him the applicant had a heart attack in his presence. He was then given the
option of being transferred to Salt Lake City, Denver or Albuquerque. The
applicant chose the Presbyterian Hospital in Albuquerque since it was closest
to his home. He was initially treated with an angiogram, and was scheduled
for angioplasty, but was informed that the status of his heart would not
tolerate that procedure without the installation of a pump. A pump was
installed and the angioplasty was performed. Mr. Olsen was advised that he
would not be a good candidate for by pass surgery, since his heart could not
withstand that procedure because the applicant has ischemic cardiomyopathy.
He has been told that he may have to receive a heart transplant in four or
five years. He was released with "a bunch of restrictions**9 so he traveled to
Arizona for some warm weather.
The applicant applied for social security benefits, and after an
initial denial, has been granted benefits.
In his early 209s Mr. Olsen broke his right leg in a snowmobile
accident. In 1970, he lost part of his right index finger in an industrial
accident he sustained in upper Michigan. He has previously been compensated
for that injury. The applicant denied any prior heart problems or chest
pain. In July of 1986, Mr. Olsen had a gallbladder problem which eventually
resulted in surgery.
The file indicates several positive risk factors for heart attack.
The applicant's family history indicates that his father died at the age of 56
of a heart attack, and that he had also had three heart attacks in his 40*s.
Mr. Olsen9s father also had diabetes and he has two brothers that also have
that condition. The applicant's mother has high blood pressure as does the
applicant. Mr. Olsen started smoking at age 16 and smoked one pack per day.
He discontinued smoking in 1982, and had put on some weight as a result. Just
before his heart attack of October 29, 1984, he had resumed smoking again.
The applicant9* medical records indicate that he has high cholesterol levels
and elevated LOL and trigylceride levels.
With the file in this posture, the case was referred to a medical
panel for its evaluation. The medical panel found that there was no medical
causal relation between the applicant's heart attack of October 29, 1984, and
his work activities of that date. The panel found that the cause of the
applicant9s heart attack was due to "progressive atherosclerotic blockage of
the coronary artery9*. The panel concluded that the applicant9s heart attack
"was simply due to the combination of pre-disposing factors Which he had at
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the time. We would not attribute any causative role to any physical work
which he was doing at the time." With respect to the heart attack of December
2, 1985, the panel found no causal connection between it and the attack of
October 29, 1984. Rather the panel found that the attack was caused by the
applicant's premature pre-existing atherosclerosis. It should also be noted
that the first heart attack involved an acute anterior wall myocardial
infarction.
By comparison, the second attack involved the inferior left
ventricle wall.
Dr. Perry, a cardiologist, concluded that "clearly the
inferior wall myocardial infarction was caused by acute occlusion of a vessel
not involved with his first myocarcial infarction directly. The applicant's
treating physician, Dr. Davidson, also fails to attribute a direct causal
connection between the activities of October 29, 1984 and the attack of
December 2, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge, after considering all of the
evidence, adopts the findings of the medical panel as his own.
Because of the pre-existing heart disease, it is necessary to apply
the test of Allen v. Industrial Commission concerning legal causation. The
activities of October 29, 1984 must have amounted to exertion beyond what the
applicant would have expended in the activities of every day life. Giving the
applicant the benefit of the doubt, I find his exertion in lifting the trailer
tongue may be extraordinary and therefore would satisfy the legal causation
requirement of Allen. However, the applicant must also satisfy the medical
causation test of Allen. Based on the findings of the medical panel and the
preponderance of medical evidence, and considering the applicant's positive
risk factors for heart disease, I conclude that he has not satisfied the
medical causation requirement of the Allen accident test. Accordingly, the
applicant's claim must be denied.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant has not sustained his burden of proving that his heart
condition was medically caused by his work activities of October 29, 1984.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Douglas Olsen for
compensation benefits for an industrial accident on October 29, 1984, should
be, and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

shall

be

Exhibit
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s p e c i f y i n g i n d e t a i l the particular e r r o r s and o b j e c t i o n s , and, u n l e s s
f i l e d , t h i s Order s h a l l be f i n a l and not s u b j e c t t o review or appeal.

Timothy C. AJft^fl"'
AdminislrraT^va Law Judge

Passed by the I n d u s t r i a l Commission
of Utah, S a l t Lake City, Utah, t h i s
i P . ^ f e - d a y off February, 1988.
ATTEST:

Linda J . S t r i s W i r g
Commission S e c r e t a r y

so

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No: 86000411
*

DOUGLAS R. OLSEN,
Applicant,

*

*

ORDER DENYING

*

vs.

*
TYCER CONSTRUCTION and/or
WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY and
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

*
*
*
*
* * * * *

On February 26, 1988, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying
workers compensation benefits for the above-referenced applicant's December 2,
1985 myocardial infarction and denying additional workers compensation
benefits for a October 29, 1984 myocardial infarction incurred by the
applicant. The Administrative Law Judge based his denial on the conclusions
of the medical panel doctor, Dr. M. Preece. Dr. Preece concluded that the
October 29, 1984 myocardial infarction was not caused by exertion at work and
that the December 2, 1985 myocardial infarction was also not caused by work,
nor related to the October 29, 1984 myocardial infarction.
Prior to the examination and report of Dr. Preece, two other doctor
opinions had been rendered regarding the medical cause of the applicant's
myocardial infarction. Dr. J. Perry reviewed the applicant's medical records,
and without addressing the cause of the 1984 myocardial infarction, stated
with definity in a letter dated March 10, 1986 that the 1985 myocardial
infarction was in no way related to the 1984 myocardial infarction. Dr. R.
Heuser similarly reviewed records regarding the 1984 myocardial infarction and
stated in a letter dated March 12, 1986 that he felt the 1985 myocardial
infarction was related to the 1984 infarction. Also, just prior to the
issuance of the Administrative Law Judge's Order, in connection with the
applicant's Objections to the medical panel report, a letter from Dr. A. M.
Davidson, the applicant's "primary care physician," was submitted stating that
the applicant's 1984 infarction was work related and that the 1985 infarction
was "directly related" to the 1984 infarction.
With 'the above-listed medical evidence submitted, the Administrative
Law Judge determined that the medical panel report should be adopted as the
preponderance of the medical evidence was supportive of the conclusions of the
medical panel doctor. On March 30, 1988, counsel for the applicant filed a
Motion for Review contesting the Administrative Law Judge's adoption of the
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••dical panel report. Counsel for the applicant raises two major issues in
*it Motion for Review. First, counsel for the applicant notes that this is
lb* first medical report he has ever seen where the doctor has stated that
»ontemporaneuous exertional activities in no way contributed to the heart
ftilure. Second, counsel for the applicant notes that it is inconsistent for
:he Administrative Law Judge to find that the 1984 infarction is not
compensable as the defendants accepted liability for that incident and paid
benefits for it.
On April 199 1988, counsel for the defendants filed a Response to the
ipplicant's Motion for Review. Addressing the two points raised by counsel
or the applicant, counsel for the defendants first points out that it is not
or the applicant's counsel to determine what is "mainstream*9 medical
ipinion. In addressing the second issue, counsel for the defendants states
hat the payment of benefits by the defendant/carrier is not equivalent to an
cceptance of liability.
In the alternative, counsel for the defendants
rgues that even if the defendants did accept liability for the 1984
nfarction by paying benefits, this does not mean that liability for the 1985
nfarction necessarily follows, as it is clear in the majority of the medical
vidence that the 1984 and 1985 infarction are not causally related.
The Commission finds that the only issue on review is whether the
dministrative Law Judge correctly determined that there is insufficient
vidence to support a finding of medical causation. This case is unusual in
he diversity of medical opinion presented. Several of the doctors who have
endered opinions regarding the causation issue have stated conclusions that
re exactly the opposite of another doctor. In cases where medical opinion
ontroverting that of the medical panel is submitted, the Commission has in
he past maintained a fairly consistent practice of deferring to the medical
anel absent good reason shown why the medical panel report is insufficient or
iased.
In the instant case, the medical panel doctor is a well respected
pecialist in cardiology and his report is clear and unequivocal regarding his
onclusions that the infarction was caused by pre-existing conditions and not
xertional activity.
Although Dr. Heuser and Dr. Davidson make contrary
onclusions, the reasons for those conclusions are not stated. In contrast,
he medical panel doctor*s conclusions are explained with a listing given of
he numerous pre-existing conditions suffered by the applicant predisposing
im to cardiac arrest. There appears no good reason to reject the medical
anel report, there being no insufficiency in the explanation and no bias,
herefore, the Commission must deny the applicant's Motion for Review and
ff irm the 'Administrative Law Judge.
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ORDER-'

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicants, March 30, 1988 Motion
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's February 26, 1988
Order is hereby affirmed and final with further review to the Court of Appeals
only within the thirty (30) day time limit as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83.

fKomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
/^fe day of 4**y, 1988.
ATTEST:

(2jUsfU-^

Linda J. >£Xrasburs
Commission Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on June J__%
1988, a copy of the attached ORDER
3S.VYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of DOUGLAS R. OLSEN was mailed to the
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:

Douglas R. Olsen
P. 0. Box 687
Mancos, CO 81328
Robert J. Shaughnessy
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 963
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Michael Dyer
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT

84110

Wausau Insurance
P. 0. Box 7400
Murray, UT 84107
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Pamela Hayes /
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language of the insurance policy states
that defects created by the insured, i.e.
Valley Bank, are excluded from coverage.
We next address Valley Bank's claim
that exclusions for defects created by the
insured should not be enforced in the absence of fraud or misconduct on the part of
the insured. Valley Bank cites a number
of cases in support of its proposition. See,
e.g., American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 793 F.2d 780 (6th
Cir.1986); Brown v. St Paul Title Ins.
Corp., 634 F.2d 1103 (8th Cir.1980); Taussig v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 171 F.2d
553 (7th Cir.1948); Conway v. Title Ins.
Co., 291 Ala. 76, 277 So.2d 890 (1973); Ginger v. American Title Ins. Co., 29 Mich.
App. 279, 185 N.W.2d 54 (1971); Feldman
v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 87 NJ.Super.
391, 209 A.2d 640 (1965).
After reviewing these cases, we find
they are all either factually distinguishable
from this case, or do not support Valley
Bank's proposition. For instance, in American Savings and Loan, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals declared that an insured
"creates" a defect if the lien " Resulted
from some intentional misconduct or ...
the insured either expressly or impliedly
... agreed to the defects . . . in the course
of purchasing the property involved/"
793 F.2d at 784 (quoting Brown v. SL Paul
Title Ins. Co., 634 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 n. 8
(8th Cir.1980)) (emphasis added). See also
Feldman, 209 A.2d at 647-48 (created
means some affirmative act bringing the
defect into "fruition"). See generally Annotation, Title Insurance: Exclusion of
Liability for Defects, Liens, or Encumbrances Created, Suffered, Assumed, or
Agreed to by the Insured, 87 A.LR.3d 515,
516-17 (1978).
We decline to rewrite4 or read into Valley Bank's policy of title insurance that the
insurer must establish the insured was
guilty of fraud or misconduct before invoking the protections of the exclusionary
clause. Moreover, had the parties intended
such a restriction, they could have easily
«• S*e Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 132
(U;ah Ct.App.1989) ("it is not the function of a
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provided for the same through the terms of
the policy itself. Cf. Zions First Nat'I
Bank, 749 P.2d at 654 ("if something
broader . . . was intended by [the] language, certainly the drafter . . . could have
included appropriate language"); Draughon, 771 P.2d at 1107.
In sum, we hold Valley Bank intentionally and deliberately "created" the SBA trust
deed lien, and it is therefore, expressly
excepted from coverage under the terms of
Valley Bank's policy. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ.,
concur.
(O f «Y HUMH SYSTW>

Douglas R. OLSEN, Petitioner,
•.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Tyger Construction, Wausau Insurance
Company, and Second Injury Fund, Respondents.
No. 880407-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 23, 1989.
Workers' compensation claimant applied for additional benefits for earlier
heart attack as well as benefits for second
heart attack, alleging that they were causally related. The Industrial Commission
denied workers' compensation benefits, and
claimant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Billings, J., held that (1) evidence supported determination that neither heart attack was medically related to claimant's
employment activities; (2) mere fact that
employer paid benefits initially without
contesting liability did not estop it from
court to rewrite an unambiguous contract").
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contesting liability for additional benefits;
and (3) Industrial Commission's review of
request for additional benefits for first
heart attack was not limited to consideration of whether claimant's condition had
deteriorated, since Commission had never
formally considered petitioner's initial
claim arising from first heart attack.
Affirmed.
1. Workers' Compensation e»1546
Determination that workers' compensation claimant's heart attacks were not
medically related to his employment activities was not arbitrary or capricious or without any reasonable basis in evidence, even
though Industrial Commission discounted
opinions of claimant's experts and adopted
opinion of medical panel, where there was
competent medical evidence in record that
heart attacks were result of premature atheroclerosis and claimant's major risk
factors for heart disease.
2. Workers* Compensation <*»1357, 1937
Dicta in which Industrial Commission
improperly suggested that it could afford
presumption of correctness to medical panel's opinion, although inappropriate, was
harmless where it did not appear to have
affected Commission's decision.
3. Workers' Compensation 4=>1303
Mere fact that employer pays workers'
compensation benefits initially without contesting liability does not mean that it is
thereafter, as matter of law, estopped from
contesting liability.
4. Workers' Compensation *=>1303
Workers' compensation claimant failed
to establish that his employer was estopped
from contesting its liability for additional
benefit for earlier heart attack for which
claimant had received temporary disability
benefits, where claimant failed to demonstrate, among other things, that he
changed his position or relinquished any
rights as result of receiving such benefits.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-78.
5. Workers' Compensation «»2077
Where Industrial Commission's review
of request for additional benefits for work-
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er's compensation claimant's earlier heart
attack was not limited to consideration of
whether claimant's condition had deteriorated, where employer had voluntarily
paid temporary disability benefits and Com.
mission had thus never formally considered
initial claim.
Jay A. Meservy, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Michael E. Dyer and Brad C. Betebenner,
Salt Lake City, for respondents Tyger
Const, and Wausau Ins. Co.
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for
respondent Second Injury Fund.
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and
BILLINGS, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Petitioner Douglas Olsen appeals from
the Industrial Commission s decision denying him workers' compensation benefits for
injuries he suffered as a result of two
separate heart attacks. We affirm.
FACTS
Petitioner was hired by Tyger Construetion as a laborer in April 1984. It is undisputed that prior to his employment with
Tyger, petitioner had a famfy history of
heart attacks, diabetes, and high blood
pressure, and a personal history of smoking approximately one pack of cigarettes
per day since age 16, and high blood cholesterol and triglyceride levels, all of which
predisposed petitioner to heart disease. On
October 29, 1984, petitioner suffered a
heart attack while at work. He was subsequently diagnosed as having suffered an
acute anterior wall myocardial infarction.
Petitioner was hospitalized for sever»l
days, and received uncontested temporary
total disability benefits for the period October 30, 1984, through December 2, 19S4.
On December 3, 1984, petitioner was released by his attending physician and informed that he could return to work without limitation.

Addendum -12-

OLSEN v. INDUSTR KL COM'N OF UTAH

Utah

939

Cite M 776 ?2d ' 1 (UuhApp. 19S9)

In June 1985, petitioner was assigned by
Tyger to supervise several concrete plants.
Between June and October of 1985, petitioner claimed he worked sixty hours per
week. By November 1985, petitioner was
working seven days a week until the plants
supervised by petitioner were shut down on
November 22, 1985. Following the shut
down, petitioner and his wife traveled to
Colorado for a vacation. On December 2,
1985, petitioner suffered a second heart
attack. The second heart attack was diagnosed as a myocardial infarction involving
the inferior left ventricle wall and rendered
him permanently and totally disabled.
Following the second heart attack, petitioner filed two claims for disability benefits. One claim requested additional benefits for the 1984 heart attack, the second
for injuries suffered as a result of the 1985
heart attack. The administrative law judge
conducted an evidentiary hearing and referred its summation of the evidence to a
medical panel doctor. Although there was
conflicting medical evidence in the record,
the administrative law judge ultimately
adopted the findings expressed by the
medical panel doctor, Dr. Preece. Based
on these findings, the administrative law
judge denied both claims. The Commission
affirmed the administrative law judge's determination concluding: 1) petitioner's 1985
heart attack was not related to or precipitated by his 1984 heart attack, and 2)
neither the 1984 heart attack nor the 1985
heart attack was medically related to petitioner's employment activities.
Petitioner appeals from the Commission's decision claiming: 1) both heart attacks were compensable industrial accidents and the Commission's determination
that no medical causation existed was arbitrary and capricious, and 2) since Tyger
paid petitioner disability benefits for the
1984 heart attack, it is estopped from challergir g its liability in these proceedings,
and the Commission erred in failing to so
determine.
*• Th.s* proceedings were commenced before
*he effective date of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to
~221! 938 Supp.). For a recent case discussing the
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MEDICAL CAUSATION
[1] Petitioner claims the medical testimony demonstrates that both his 1984 and
1985 heart attacks were medically related
to his employment activities. Legal causation is not disputed. Thus, our review is
limited to whether the Commission's determination that petitioner's heart attacks
were not medically related to his employment activities was arbitrary and capricious or "without any reasonable basis in
the evidence'' to support it See, e.g.,
Rush ton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109,
111 (Utah 1986).1
To demonstrate "medical causation," petitioner must introduce evidence establishing "that the stress, strain, or exertion
required by his or her occupation led to the
resulting injury or disability." Allen v.
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah
1986). For this purpose, petitioner proffered the written medical opinions of his
two attending physicians, Dr. Heuser, a
cardiologist, and Dr. Davidson, a family
practitioner. Dr. Davidson concluded petitioner's 1984 heart attack was related to
his employment activities and the 1985
heart attack was a recurrence of the 1984
heart attack. Dr. Heuser similarly concluded that the heart attacks were related
but did not express an opinion concerning
their relationship to petitioner's work activities.
However, after examining the petitioner
and reviewing the administrative law
judge's summation of the evidence and petitioner's medical records, Dr. Preece, the
medical panel doctor, concluded petitioner's
heart attacks resulted from preexisting
medical conditions, and were not related to
his employment activities. Specifically, Dr.
Preece concluded the petitioner's 1984
heart attack resulted from a blocked coronary artery. Dr. Preece believed the blockage was due to preexisting heart disease,
and not due to any physical work the petitioner performed on the day of his attack.
Dr. Preece similarly concluded the 1985
heart attack was a result of premature
Act's effect on the standard for reviewing agency
findings of fact, see Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 66-6S (Utah Ct.App.1989).
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atherosclerosis and not petitioner's work
activities preceding the attack. In his letter to the administrative law judge, Dr.
Preece wrote:
In summary, . . . we have an early middle-aged male wljp is unfortunate enough
to have had two separate myocardial infarctions. He obviously has premature
atherosclerosis and we would attribute
this to his major risk factors including
the cigarette smoking, the elevated blood
cholesterol, and particularly the positive
family history for coronary artery disease.
[2] Petitioner's claim, therefore, is that
the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by discounting the opinions of his
experts and adopting the opinion of the
medical panel.1
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly
stated that where the medical evidence is
conflicting, "it is the responsibility of the
administrative law judge to resolve factual
conflicts." Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev.t 736
P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 1987). Moreover, we
do not deem the Commission's findings arbitrary and capricious "simply because the
Commission adopted the findings of the
panel rather than those of the independent
physicians
" Rekward v. Industrial
Comm% 755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah CtApp.
1988). Accordingly, we find there was
competent, comprehensive medical evidence
in the record upon which the Commission
could rely in concluding that petitioner's
heart attacks were not medically related to
2. Petitioner also claims the Commission improperly afforded greater weight to the medical
panel's opinion. Specifically, the Commission
wrote:
In cases where medical opinion controverting
that of the medical panel is submitted, the
Commission has in the past maintained a fairly consistent practice of deferring to the medical panel absent good reason shown why the
medical panel report is insufficient or biased.
In the instant case, the medical panel doctor
is a well respected specialist in cardiology and
his report is clear and unequivocal regarding
his conclusions that the infarction was caused
by pre-existing conditions and not exertional
activity. Although Dr. Heuser and Dr. Davidson make contrary conclusions, the reasons
for those conclusions are not stated. In contrast, the medical panel doctor's conclusions
are explained with a listing given [sic] of the
numerous pre-existing conditions suffered by
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his employment activities, and thus we reject this aspect of petitioner's challenge.
REOPENING LIABILITY FOR 1984
HEART ATTACK
Petitioner also filed a claim for additional
benefits relating to the 1984 heart attack,
claiming that since he had received the
temporary disability benefits, his condition
had deteriorated. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-78 (1988). The Commission, again
relying on the opinions of the medical panel, rejected .petitioner's claim. Instead, the
Commission concluded the 1984 heart attack was not a compensable industrial accident because it was not medically related
to petitioner's employment activities. Petitioner claims the Board was precluded
from "reopening" the initial question of
compensibility of the prior 1984 heart attack because Tyger had voluntarily paid
benefit*. Therefore, petitioner argues
Tyger is estopped from now denying that
his injury was compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act Petitioner
further argues the Commission's review
should have been limited to a consideration
of whether his condition had deteriorated,
which if answered in the affirmative, entitled him to additional disability benefits.
[3,4] Petitioner's position fails for two
reasons. First, the mere fact that an employer pays benefits initially without contesting liability does not mean it is thereafter, as a matter of law, barred from
contesting liability. See, e.g., Crow v. Inthe applicant predisposing him to cardiac arrest.
Petitioner claims the Commission granted the
medical panel's expert opinion a presumption of
correctness, contrary to Utah law. See, e.g..
Rushton v. Gtlco Express, 732 P.2d 109. 111-12
(Utah 19S6). We agree the Commissions statements are inappropriate. The Commission
must always weigh conflicting evidence in light
of materiality, credibility, and competency,
among other recognized considerations, without
any preconceived deference to either sideHowever, we are not persuaded the Commission's unfortunate d-cta affected its decision.
Taken in the context of the Commission's further elaborations, it is clear that the Commission also considered acceptable factors, and
found the medical panel opinion more credible
and based on specific preexisting conditions suffered by petitioner.
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dustrial Comm\ 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d
321, 321-22 (1943); Harding v. Industrial
Comm% 83 Utah 376, 28 P.2d 182, 184
(1934); Taggart v. Industrial Comm% 79
Utah 598, 12 P.2d 356, 357 (1932). In Harding, the Utah Supreme Court wrote:
Ordinarily, in the absence of prejudice to
the employee or of facts giving rise to
estoppel, an insurance earner may, notwithstanding voluntary payment of compensation, the furnishing of hospital or
medical care, the entry of appearance, or
statement made that the policy covered
the employee, urge the defense that the
employee did not meet with an accident,
... or that there was no causal connection between the injury and disability.
28 P.2d at 184. Petitioner has failed to
allege sufficient facts to establish that
Tyger should be estopped from contesting
its liability for the 1984 heart attack. For
Instance, petitioner has not demonstrated
that he changed his position or relinquished
any rights as a result of receiving temporary disability payments. Cf. Crow, 140
P.2d at 321.
Moreover, adopting the position urged by
petitioner would encourage employers to
contest all employment related injuries to
avoid later being estopped from raising
their claims.
It would be unjust to both the employee
and the insurance carrier if the law were
that when the insurance carrier once undertakes to provide medical or other care
for an injured [employee] it has lost all
right to afterwards defend against what
it believes to be an unjust or illegal
claim. The insurance carrier cannot and
ought not wait until full investigation
has been made before providing necessary care and treatment for injured [employees].
Harding, 28 P.2d at 184. See generally, 4
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law
§ 82.61 at 15-1215 to 15-1224 (1989) (volunto-y payment does not constitute an
award" for which proceedings may be reopened nor does it waive the employer's
n
£h: to later dispute the claim).
[5] A second reason for rejecting petitioner's claim is that petitioner's 1984 heart
attack was never formally considered by
^e Industrial Commission. Thus, the
Exhibit
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Commission did not "reopen" the issue of
compensability, but rather reviewed petitioner's heart attack for the first time. Accordingly, we review the Commission's determination with respect to the 1984 heart
attack under the same standard of review
previously set forth in this opinion, and our
conclusion remains the same—there is substantial, competent medical testimony supporting the Commission's conclusion that
petitioner's 1984 heart attack was not medically related to his employment activities.
Based on the foregoing, the Commission's determination denying petitioner disability benefits is affirmed.
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ.,
concur.

FASHION PLACE INVESTMENT, LTD.,
a partnership, aka Fashion Place Associates, Fashion Place Investors Ltd., a
limited partnership, Capitol Life Insurance Company, Valley Mortgage Company, Dr. Robert Anderson, Dr. Barlow
L. Packer, Dr. Orlando T. Barrowes,
Dr. Carlson Terry, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, et
al., Defendants and Respondents.
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, et al.
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
Richard HARMAN, d/b/a Building
Management Services, and Safeco Insurance Company, et al., Third-Party
Defendants.
No. 870553-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 26, 1989.
Landlord's insurer sought subrogation
against tenant for damages resulting from
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March 10, 1986
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Mr. Dick Sagara
WAUSAU Insurance Co.
P.O. Box 7400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
RE:

MR. DOUGLAS RONALD OLSEN

Dear Mr. Sagara:
I have reviewed the records of Douglas Ronald Olsen who is a 44
year old who has suffered an acute anterior wall myocardial infarction on about
October 28, 1984. Details of his activity and precipitating factors were not
included in the material sent to me. He was transferred from Roosevelt to LDS
Hospital in Salt Lake City three days later where he underwent heart catheterization and a coronary angioplasty on November 2nd. The heart catheterization
at that time revealed multivessel disease with severe stenosis, presumably responsible for his myocardial infarction and a blockage of intermediate severity
in a separate coronary artery, the right coronary artery.
Fourteen months after his initial myocardial infarction of the
anterior wall, he suffered a myocardial infarction involving his inferior left
ventricular wall. Repeat coronary angiography done December 16, 1985 revealed
a total occlusion of the right coronary artery where he previously had the
50% stenosis documented in the catheterization at LDS Hospital in November of 84,
Clearly the inferior wall myocardial infarction was caused by acute occlusion of
a vessel not involved with his first myocardial infarction directly.
From this I would definitely state that there was no direct
relationship between his first myocardial infarction and the second myocardial
infarction fourteen months later in December of 1985.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact r^.e.
Siacerely,

J. Joseph Pe rrv/ M

JJP/jv
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Douglas 1. Olsen
10/29/84
Tyger Construction
Uausau Insurance Companies
86000411
09/16/86, 10:00 a.m.
Robert J. Shaughnessy, Attorney at Law
Michael B. Dyer, Attorney at Law
Joined

SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY

Douglas R. Olsen was hired by Tyger Construction as a laborer in
April of 1984 to work on the Stillwater Dam project. The Applicant had
previously worked as a crane operator, and once he had worked for Tyger for
four days, he was then assigned to work as a crane operator. Prior to taking
a job with Tyger Construction, the Applicant was examined by Dr. Ace Madsen at
the Roosevelt Clinic for a pre-employment physical. The Applicant testified
that when he started working as a crane operator, he was erecting equipment
and structures for the rock crushing operation, by using a crane. In July of
1984 Mr. Olsen was asked to become the operator of the crushing plant. This
job involved working in a trailer and running a control board. The Applicant
was then promoted to the night foreman of the maintenance crew of the crushing
plant. On this job, the Applicant testified that they were working anywhere
from eight or ten or twelve hours per night.
On October 29, 1984, the shift had started at approximately 6:00
p.m. It was cold, and the Applicant had on heavy clothing, which was normal
for this time of year in Duchesne County. The maintenance crew utilized
portable welding machines as part of their equipment repair responsibility.
The Applicant testified that the machines would sit outside and would thaw out
during the day, but by the time they reported for work at 6:00 p.m., the
machines would be frozen to the ground, which was the situation on October 29,
1984. They had hooked one of the 500-amp welding machines to a truck and were
attempting to move it when they discovered that it was frozen to the ground.
The Applicant and two other workers then took hold of the tongue of the
trailer up^n Which the welding machine was mounted and tugged on it with all
of their might* The trailer tongue came loose, and they then attached it to
the truck.
The Applicant then went and sat in the pickup, and after
approximately five minutes he felt a pain and some pressure in his left
chest. The Applicant testified that the pain he felt was intense, and after
they had stopped the truck, which was a few minutes later, he exited and then
went and sat on a bank of dirt, thinking that his chest pain would go away.
The chest pain did not go away, and the Applicant further testified that he
was sweaty and clammy and that his left arm started to hurt. He then went to
the trailer, and his condition worsened, so he had two of his people take him
to the medical trailer there at the job site. He was seen by the EMT, who
opined that since there had been numerous flu complaints, the Applicant might
be having chest pains as a result of some flu. When the Applicant's condition
did not improve, he was taken by ambulance to the Duchesne County Hospital,
where he came under the treatment of Dr. Ace Madsen. Dr. Madsen advised the
Applicant that he was having a heart attack, and he was then given an
Exhibit "E" p. 1
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injection of Streptokinase. At the time of his injury, the Applicant was
working at an altitude of 8,200-8,300 feet.
After his condition had stabilized at the Duchesne County Hospital,
the Applicant was transferred to L.D.S. Hospital, where he came under the
treatjuent of Dr. Laser. Dr. Laser arranged for the Applicant to receive an
angiogram, and the Applicant was also given an angioplasty, which was
performed by Dr. Laser. The Applicant was then discharged from the hospital
approximately four or five days later, and he then returned to the Roosevelt
area. He received follow-up care from Dr. Madsen, and on December 3, 1984,
the Applicant was released to return to work with no ^ limitations. The
Applicant was paid temporary total disability compensation for the period
October 30, 1984, through December 2, 1984,
When the Applicant returned to work on December 3, 1984, the
maintenance, which had previously been performed at night, was now being
performed by the daytime crew, so the Applicant was returned to his job as the
crusher operator. He continued to work in this capacity until December 22,
1984, when the employees of the crusher were laid off because everything would
freeze up in the crusher.
In January of 1985 the Applicant was requested to return to operate a
crane, which was on a ledge on the side of a mountain. He was operating a
250-foot boom which had a basket attached that he would use to haul workers
who were engaged in the blasting of rock at the face of the mountain. The
Applicant would sometimes move one basket per hour, or sometimes he would move
the basket one time every three hours. This job consisted solely of sitting
and operating hand controls. The Applicant continued this job until June of
1985, when he was put in charge of the ready-mix concrete plants. The
ready-mix plants had Plant No. 1 in operation and had a well-trained crew.
However, Plant Nos. 2 and 3 were staffed by inexperienced personnel, and the
Applicant was busy training these people until approximately mid-August of
1985. There had also been three conveyor belts installed at the concrete
plants for the purpose of moving the concrete from the plants to the dam
site. The Applicant was in charge of the operation and setup of those
conveyors, and between June and October of 1985 the Applicant was working
sixty hours per week on a minimum.
One of the conveyor belts from the concrete plant ran to the dam
site, and the belt was on a seven-degree angle running downhill. The
Applicant testified that it was "hellacious" coming back, in that it was a
steep incline and the belt was a mile long. While walking up this belt in
September of 1985, the Applicant started noticing what he thought was
"heartburn" high in his stomach and low chest area. The Applicant would have
to stop and catch his breath for approximately three or four minutes, and he
would also take a Turns or Rolaids and the heartburn would go away. The
Applicant denied having this "heartburn" at any other time other than while
walking up the conveyor belt. He also testified that his heartburn became
more and more frequent. By November of 1985 the Applicant stated that they
Exhibit "E" p. 2
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were working seven days per week, working very long hours, and that they were
only getting approximately five or six hours per night of sleep. They had
exceeded their quota of concrete which had been set by the company. Everyone
was tired, and they were ready for a layoff. On November 22, 1985, the
operation shut down, and the Applicant was able to leave Altamont and take his
forty-foot trailer to Ignatio, Colorado, to a friend*s farm, since his home in
Hancos, Colorado, was being rented out. The Applicant testified that upon his
arrival, he and his wife just relaxed, since there was nothing else to do in
that area.
On December 2, 1985, at approximately 6:00 a.m., the Applicant woke
up with a severe case of heartburn. The heartburn went all the way to the
roof of his mouth, and after taking some heartburn medication, he noticed no
improvement. He then roused his wife, and she took him to the Mercy Medical
Center in Durango, Colorado, where he was treated by Dr. Bruce Wilson. The
Applicant was placed in the ICCU for approximately a week and was also given a
double dose of Streptokinase, but with no improvement. While his doctor was
treating him, the Applicant had a heart attack in his presence. The Applicant
was then given the option of being transferred to Salt Lake City, Denver, or
Albuquerque. The Applicant chose the Presbyterian Hospital in Albuquerque,
since it was closest to his home. He was then transferred to their care. He
was initially treated with an angiogram, and was scheduled for angioplasty,
but was informed that the status of his heart would not tolerate that
procedure without the installation of a pump, A pump was installed, and then
angioplasty was performed. The Applicant was advised that he would not be a
good candidate for a bypass surgery, since his heart could not withstand that
procedure. The Applicant has been told that he may have to receive a heart
transplant in four or five years.
He was released with "a bunch of
restrictions,9' so he traveled to Mesa, Arizona, for some warm weather. He was
staying at his in-laws' house and had been told by his doctor that he should
walk as much as possible. He did so, and then noticed that he was having
abdominal swelling. He was seen by a cardiologist in the Phoenix area,
Dr. Mark Stern, who informed him that his heart was enlarging, and so he was
given water pills, which improved his condition.
The Applicant applied for Social Security benefits, and was denied
initially, but was then granted benefits upon filing an appeal.
In his early twenties Mr. Olsen broke his right leg in a snowmobile
accident. In 1970 he lost part of his right index finger in an industrial
accident he sustained in upper Michigan. He has previously been compensated
for that injury. The Applicant denied any prior heart problems or chest
pains.
In July of 1986 the Applicant had a gallbladder problem, which
eventually resulted in gallbladder surgery.
On cross-examination, the Applicant testified that his father died at
age fifty-six of a heart attack and that he had also previously had a heart
attack in his forties. His father also had diabetes, and Mr. Olsen has two
brothers that also have diabetes. The Applicant's mother has high blood
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pressure, as does the Applicant, Mr* Olsen started smoking at age sixteen,
and would smoke one pack per day. He discontinued smoking in 1982, and he put
on some weight as a result. Just before his heart attack of October 29, 1984,
he had resumed smoking again. Following his heart attack of October 29, 1984,
he discontinued smoking at the instruction of his doctors, and in July of 1985
he started smoking again, but on a limited basis. The Applicant's records
indicate that he has high cholesterol levels, but Mr. Olsen could not recall
being told this by his doctors. He was told that he had coronary disease
after his heart attack of October 29, 1984. The Applicant testified that the
pain in his chest while climbing the conveyor belt was completely different
and in a different location than the pain he had on October 29, 1984.
Dr. Heuser released the Applicant to return to work on March 1, 1986. The
Applicant applied for unemployment compensation on Movesober 25, 1985, and
received some benefits, but was terminated when he moved to the Phoenix area.
At present, the Applicant tires easily. He can mow his lawn, but it
takes quite a bit longer. He also complains of occasional chest pain.
With the file in this posture, the Medical Panel will need to
determine if the heart attack of October 29, 1984, is a result of or related
to the work activities of October 29, 1984. The Panel will also need to
determine if the heart attack of December 2, 1985, is causally related to the
heart attack of October 29, 1984. The Panel will also need to ascertain the
permanent impairment due to the injury of October 29, 1984, and due to
preexisting heart impairment. Finally, the Panel will need to indicate if the
injury of October 29, 1984, aggravated the preexisting heart condition and, if
so, whether that aggravation was permanent or temporary.

^r
^
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November 19, I9d7 ;

Timothy Allen
Administrative Law Judge
The Industrial Cccrmission of Utah
1160 Est 300 South, P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84145-0580
Re:

Douglas R. Olsen

Dear Mr. Allen:
This letter will sunmarize for you the results of my evaluation of
Mr. Douglas R. Olsen.
This 47-year-old male has risk factors for vascular diseasef including a 25
pack year history of cigarettes which he stopped in November of 1985f a history
of elevated blood cholesterol, and a significant family history for coronary
disease. His father had an infarct at age 52 and later died of cancer. His
sister had percutaneous angioplasty of coronary artery obstruction at age 55.
The patient's cardiac history began on October 29, 1984, when he was
hospitalized in Roosevelt, Utah with an acute anterior wall myocardial
infarction in progress. He was treated with streptokinase intravenously and
two days later was transferred to Salt Lake City. He was found here to have a
severe occlusion of the proximal left anterior descending artery and an
angioplasty vas done of that vessel. Presumably the infarct that had occurred
vas transmural prior to the angioplasty, howaver.
The patient subsequently returned to work in January of 1985. He did well
until December 2f 1985. Prior to December 2, 1985f he had been working on a
dam construction project near Roosevelt, Utah. His job required him to do
rather strenuous physical work repeatedly each day. He did wall during that
workf howaver. At the last of November, the job site was closed down and he
returned to his home near Durangof Colorado. On December 2f 1987, two days
after returning hone he was again hospitalized with chest pain and this time
found to have an acute inferior wall myocardial infarction. His early post
myocardial infarction course vas complicated by overt left heart failure.
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About one week following his admission to the hospital, he developed more chest
pain. He was then transferred to Albuquerquef New Mexico where coronary
angiography was performed. That study showed him to have significant three
vessel coronary artery disease. He had total occlusion of the right coronary
artery over much of its middle third and a recurrence of 90 percent severe
occlusion of the proximal left anterior descending artery. An intra-aortic
balloon was placed for hemodynamic support and an angioplasty was done of his
proximal left anterior descending artery lesion. His section fraction was
very markedly decreased and described as being 24 percent on that occasion.
Subsequently, the patient has been stable. He is on nultiple medications, but
has not developed any overt cardiac failure and is experiencing no recurrent
chest pain.
He does have a chronic severe exertional breathlessness and such minor activity
as climbing a single flight of stairs renders him significantly breathless. He
does denie, however, any palpitations, edema, orthopnea. He also has no
breathlessness at rest.
I failed to mention that his second myocardial infarction was preceded by a
several week history of exertional burning pain in the substernal areaf which
probably in retrospect represented angina pectoris, although the patient
attributed it to "heartburn."
His current medications include Dipyridamole 75 mg b.i.d., Cardiazem 30 mg
b.i.d. f aspirin 325 mg b.i.d., Lasix 40 mg daily, Tagamet 300 mg as needed for
abdominal pain. He takes zero to one per day. Questran one scoop before
meals, and Niacin 500 mg twice daily.
On physical examination he is a mildly overweight, middle-aged male. His
weight is 210 lbs., his height is 71 inches, his blood pressure is 120/70, his
pulse is 64 and regular. His neck veins are not distended. His cardiac exam
reveals a prominent apical inpulse, evidencing left ventricular enlargement. I
do not hear any nunnurs or gallops, however. His extremities are free of
edema. His abdominal exam is negative and his pulses are normal without
carotid bruits.
In sunmary, then we have an early middle-aged male who is unfortunate enough to
have had two separate myocardial infarctions. He obviously has premature
atherosclerosis and we would attribute this to his major risk factors including
the cigarette smoking, the elevated blood cholesterol, and particularly the
positive family history for coronary artery diseaes.
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I will answer the questions opposed in your letter of November 16f 1987.
The first question has to do with whether or not the heart attack of
October 29, 1984, was a result of or related to the work activities which he
was engaged in at the tine. The myocardial infarction is known to be due to
progressive atherosclerotic blockage of a coronary artery. The final event in
a myocardial infarction is a clot which develops at the site of the severe
atherosclerotic obstruction. This clot usually occurs while the patient is at
rest and not usually during exertion. It would be very difficulty to explain
how his various work activities might have had a causative role in producing
the myocardial infarction. Our best understanding is that it was sinply due to
the combination of predisposing factors which he had at the time. We would not
attribute any causative role to any physical work which he was doing at the
time.
The second question relates to whether or not the heart attack of
December 2, 1985, was causally related to the heart attack of October 29, 1984.
If I understand the question correctly, the answer is no, the myocardial
infarction of December 2, 1985, was not produced by the myocardial of
October 29, 1984. However, both nr/ocardial infarctions have a camion
causative element, that is the premature atherosclerosis which this patient is
unfortunate enough to have.
The third question relates to the degree of impairment from the myocardial
infarction of October 29, 1984. Obviously, the myocardial infarction which he
sustained on that date, did produce significant damage to his heart. He was,
of course, able to return to work with a somewhat coipromised heart and seemed
to function fairly well. His very extensive inccnpacity at present, is due to
the combination of the two separate myocardial infarctions, which in
combination have produced very extensive dysfunction of his heart.
The next question is "what is the pre-existing heart impairment?" I am not
sure what is intended by this question. If you are asking what was the heart
inpairment prior to his first myocardial infarction in October of 1984, then
the answer is that he had no significant inpairment of the heart muscle. He
did obviously have early, extensive, and progressive coronary atherosclerosis.
The function of the iruscle pump, however, was presumeably normal prior to his
first heart attack.
The final question asks whether or not the injury of October 29, 1984,
aggravated the pre-existing heart condition, if so, was the aggravation
perranent or tenporary.
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I think this question has already been answered , if you will study all of the
above material and try to understand the concepts contained therein. The
answer to this question would be that he had no signif icant impairment of the
heart muscle prior to October of 1984f and the first injury he had occurred on
October 19, 1984. Obviously, this infarct produced a permanent scar or amount
of damaged muscle to his heart* That amount of nuscle by itself was not enough
to incapacitate him. It was only when the second myocardial infarction
occurred in December of 1985f that he had sufficient muscle damage so that he
is now penranently and significantly incapacitated.
This letter will constitute my final report to you.
questions, please feel free to write or call.

If there are any further

J. Preece, M.D.
MJP:cm
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THE INDUSTPIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 86000411
DOUGLAS R. OLSEN,
Employee-Applicant,
vs.
TYGER CONSTRUCTION CO.,
Employer-Defendant,

MOTION

WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY,

FOR

Insurance CarrierDefendant,

REVIEW

AND
SECOND INJURY FUND,

Applicant

herein

files

this

Motion for Review on the

grounds that the Administrative Law Judge incorrectly applied
accepted medical

principles of

incorrectly applied the rules

causation in heart cases and
announced in

Allen v. Indust-

rial Commission.
The

above

Motion

for

Review will be supported by the

following Memorandum.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REVIEW
1.

Dismissal of Objections to Medical Panel Report.

The Medical Panel Report adoption by
Exhibit "G" p. 1
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first

workers compensation law in
exertion/

stress

or

medical opinion expressed in

this

strain

state

that

flatly denies

as being a causative factor in

myocardial infarction cases.
From the time

of

its

adoption

in

1952,

the medical

standards in heart cases the issue has always been the amount
of stress, strain or exertion.
Utah and

nationally -

Litigation in all cases

is always

directed at

strain to produce the infarct even in the

- in

the amount of

presence of severe

arteriosclerosis.
Dr.

Michael

J.

Preece

in

question of "... whether or not
29, 1984

was a

result of

which he was engaged in at
"... it

would be

dealing

with the critical

the heart

attack of October

or related to the work activities
the time"

very difficult

responded

by stating

to explain how his various

work activities might have had a causative role

in producing

the myocardial

infarction. Our best understanding is that it

was simply due

to

a

which

at

the

he

had

combination
time.

of
We

pre-disposing factors

would not attribute any

causative role to any physical work which he was doing at the
time.
It is

interesting to

note that the doctor - just prior

to the above statement - makes this observation:
ususally occurs

while the patient is at rest and not usually

during exertion."
coronary

"This clot

The

occlusions

proceed on the theory

medical history

with
that

of exertion induced

or without myocardial infarctions
the

exertion

breaks

loose the

2
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clot.
The Medical

Panel failed

required or failed
testimony

to

supplied

by

read

to read the entire file as is
or

the

understand

the

administrative

summary of

law judge.

The

judge not only explained the circumstances of the accident of
October 1984 but also the doctor failed to realize the impart
of the statement that "... The

Applicant was

paid temporary

total disability compensation for the period October 30, 1984
through December 2, 1984."

(Emphasis Added)

The doctor failed to observe or
response

of

Defendant

Wausau

understand the original

Insurance wherein the claims

representative reports as follows:
"Our company provides the workers compensation
insurance for
1984,

Tyger Construction.

while

developed

working
chest

diagnosed

as

at

pain

an

acute

On October 24,

Tyger

Construction, you

that

was

arteroseptal

subsequently
myocardial

infarction.
Our company provided medical coverage and time
loss benefits for this prcbr.e-.iu" (Emphasis Added)
The same letter goes on to state:
"We

have

relating to

gathered

the

your treatment

your problems
determined that

on

December

medical

information

following the onset of
2,

1985

and

we have

this problem has been diagnosed as

an inferior wall myocardial infarction.
Your

records

have

been

examined

by

an

3
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independent
assessment
between

cardiologist,
he

the

feels
problem

1984 and your most
1985,*

and

there

based

is

no

upon

his

relationship

you developed on October 29,

recent incident

of December 2,

(Underscoring added).

The Medical

Panel completely

ignored the report of Dr.

Ace Madsen, (Exhibit E) who not only diagnosed

the Applicant

as having the myocardial infarction and placed its occurrence
on the job on 10/29/84. This will be discussed

at length in

part III.
In the

Memorandum of

Authority submitted by Defendants

counsel the industrial nature of the incident of October 1984
was neither disputed nor denied.
In

his

Answer

filed

after the original denial by his

client Wausau, Defendant admits
off work

following his

1984, to December 4,
Let it

be known

counsel,

first heart

1984 by

attack from October 29,
for the same/

including Wausau, defendants

applicants

judge all

the Applicant was

deny liability

that everyone

applicant,

trative law

"... that

counsel,

agree that

and

the adminis-

liability was assumed and

benefits paid.
In the pre-hearing memorandum defendants counsel

by way

of background writes as follows:
"On

or

about

October

29,

1984

course and scope of

his employment,

began

chest

experiencing

sequently diagnosed

as

pains

having

and

during the

the Applicant
he was sub-

suffered

an acute

4
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Iy

letter of 3/12/86 was more specific in reporting as follows:
"... The patient
11/84

treated

had

with

an

streptokinase

angioplasty.

I saw him after

ing coronary

artery that

City.

He had

function

severe

with

anterior infarction
an

coronary

an inferior descend-

was dilated in Salt Lake

diminished

restenosis

left ventricular

of

that

vessel

and

underwent coronary angioplasty of the left anterior
descending

coronary

artery,

occluded previously in
these

medical

Salt

problems

the
Lake

vessel that was
City.

All of

have certainly related to

the first problem from 1984."
The opinion of Dr. Davidson, the treating physician, was
not

before

Dr.

administrative

Preece
law

information was

but

it

judge.

before him

was

However,

certainly
all

of

before the
the

above

and the doctor never referred to

such records and obviously did not read either the admissions
by the

Defendant, all of the medical records of treating and

consulting physicians,
played a

all

of

whom

agree

that "exertion"

part in the industrial accident of October 1984 and

that a myocardial infarction occurred.
All of the foregoing is substantial in conflict with the
opinion

of

the

administrative

law

overwhelming preponderence of the

judge

medical

"... that the
evidence

on this

file supports the findings of the Medical Panel.
With reference to the industrial accident of October 29,
1984 the

opinion

of

the

Medical

Panel

becomes

the only

6
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i

(1985) and

the activities engaged in by Applicant.

This was

truly the only issue of the case.
The Applicant's medical evidence
Drs. Heuser

and Davidson

from

Dr.

Ace Madsen,

all support the MI on 10/29/84 and

the opinion of Dr. Preece alone was contrary.
I would refer the
judge's

analysis

in

Commission to
the

recent

the administrative law

case of Mabbutt vs. Price

River Coal - Case No, 82001604.

Counsel

early defence

I have some familiarity with

of this

case so

participated in the

it.
The Commission is well
this case

aware

of

the

circumstances of

as well as the Supreme Court opinion.

issue of the case turns on exertion and

The central

medical causation in

a miner found dead at the mine face.
In

his

Order

Upon

Remand

the following appears from

Judge Allen.
"The Act does not require that the death of an
individual

be

the

result

of a necessary precip-

itating factor, rather the Workers Compensation Act
would appear to only require that the work activity
were a sufficient precipitating factor resulting in
the death of the employee."
The Judge

then proceeds

to review

various medical experts beginning with the

the opinions of the
employer's doctor

and continuing to the panel doctor and applicant's doctor.
"...

He

(Dr.

Fowles, employers doctor) also

went on to indicate that he

agreed with

Dr. Perry

8
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myocardial infarctions.
Granted

that

this

is

not

viable

evidence

for

the

proposition that this Applicant would be entitled to the same
result as Mabbutt.

It was only submitted

to demonstrate how

far outside the mainstream of thought on causation Dr. Preece
is.
It is respectfully submitted that the
bound by

blind acceptance

Supreme Court has
contrary opinion

Commission is not

of the Medical Panel report.

repeatedly
and that

held

that

it

is

The

subject to

such opinion may be the basis for

its decision.
In this case, Drs. Heuser and Davidson flatly agree that
the heart

attack of October 29, 1984 was precipitated by the

unusual exertion of that day.
liability
expect

also

(who

specifically

was

impliedly agreed

Wausau Insurance

the

agreed.

Medical

by observing

December 1985 was not causally

by assuming

Dr. Perry defendants

Panel

chairman

in Mabbutt)

only that the heart attack of
related

to

the

incident of

October, 1984.
In summary the only expert who takes a contrary position
is Dr. Preece whose position is contrary to
cardiologists.
When

you

consider

that all cardiologists upon finding
arteriosclerosis advise

substantially if

mental stress.

not all

Such evidence is particularly unusual.

the presence of severe
to reduce

most if

It

is

not completely

impossible

to

all patients

all physical and

understand

how Dr.

Preece could reach the conclusion that he did.
10
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Referring to

the letter of Dr. Heuser (Exhibit "B") and

the outlined portions dealing with the severity of
problems which

pre-existed his October 1985 accident and the

Medical Panel Report on
impairment

his heart

resulting

the same
from

subject indicate

that the

the October 1984 was significant

without expressing a percentage, it is only logical to assume
that the

arteriosclerosis was

a pre-existing disease and it

was this that produced the total disability.
This of course means that we have an
a

significant

impairment

chargeable

accident producing

to

the

balance then becomes the province of the Second
Everyone

seems

to

charge

all

particularly the

Commission

out

of

the

Injury Fund.

of the problems to the pre-

existing condition
carves

carrier

Medical Panel.

If the

this an amount representing that

which is chargeable to the accident,

the balance

applies to

the Second Injury Fund.
No one

quarrels with the fact that the Applicant is now

totally disabled, is not

supposed to

gainful

could

activity

which

engage in

any kind of

prove fatal and now receives

total disability Social Security.
As indicated above the

December

1984

incident becomes

academic if liability is placed on the October 1984 accident.
3.

Application of the Allen disease.

The Applicant testified and the administrative law judge
found

that

on

October

maintenance

at

the

temperatures, he

was
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1 1

in the course of employment.
back problems,

to meet

Since the claimant had previous

the legal

causation requirements he

must show that the moving and lifting several

piles of dairy

products weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the confined area
of the cooler exceeded the exertion

that the

average person

typically undertakes in non-employment life."
The administrative law judge has already found that "the
activities of October 29, 1984 must have amounted to exertion
beyond

what

the

life."

If necessary the legal

the bifurcated

Applicant

would have expended in ordinary
cause has

been met.

But is

approach to the matter of accident necessary,

if Applicant had no knowledge or appreciation of

the serious

problem in his heart.
The

Commission

must

remember

that the first symptoms

(pain) appeared within less than five minutes of
exertion.

Within twenty minutes the Applicant began to sweat

and become clammy.
was flu.

the unusual

When

The E.T. on the

symptoms persisted

job thought

the problem

within an hour or so the

Applicant was in the hospital.
Dr. Ace Madsen of
report of

work injury

the

clinic

and it

at

Roosevelt

should be

filed his

spelled out rather

clearly.
Dr. Madsen gives the detail as follows:
"8.

Describe complaints.

Crushing substernal

chest pain that occurred while at work on 10/30/84.
(Everyone agrees and the

form

shows

last

day of

work 10/29/84.)
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standard is

even clearer

that what

happened on October 29,

1984 was a myocardial infarction occurring on the
evidence

of

exertion

or

causal

job and no

relationship

would

Dr.

that

be

necessary.
All

doctors

agree,

myocardial infarction

including

is in

Preece,

the

fact an internal failure within

the heart and if symptoms develop on the job, as

it did here

the result would make it compensable.
I

am

certain

this

is

the

reason why Wausau assumed

liability in the first instance.
It is interesting to note that the opinion letter by Dr.
J.

Joseph

Perry

responds

to

Mr. Sagara by saying "I have

reviewed the records of Douglas Ronald Olsen who has suffered
an

acute

anterior

October 28, 1984.
factors

were

not

wall

myocardial

infarction on or about

Details of his activity
included

in

the

and precipitating

materials sent to me."

(Emphasis added).
Dr. Perry agreed that an
supplied

information

disposing factors,

I

on
feel

MI

occurred.

Applicants
reasonably

Hade

activity
certain

he been
and

pre-

his opinion

would have been the same as in Mabbutt.
A footnote

in the Allen case pretty much spells out the

Supreme Court standards and how they
note

3.

An

"internal

failure"

are applied
refers

injuries that arise from general organ
brought

about

by

an

exetion

on page 4,

to a category of

or structural failure

in the work place.

Internal

failure claims evaluated by this court include heart attacks,
16
Exhibit "G" p. 16
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hernias, and

back injuries.

Industrial Commission and
Workers'

Compensation

See generally, note, Schmidt v.

Injury

Law:

Compensability

Under Utah

A Just Result or Just Another

"Living Corpse"? 1984, Utah L. Rev. 393.
All through the heart
Court the

cases waffle

back

cases

from ordinary

internal failure as being
others.

and

by

the Supreme

activity producing an

compensable

in

some

and

not in

However, all through these cases there seems to be a

solid committment that unusual or extraordinary exertion that
results

in

an

internal

failure

has

been

deemed

to

be

compensable.
The position of
activity of
such

the

October 29,

unusual

or

only

1984 was

therefore
in fact

extraordinary

myocardial infarction
Applicant.

Applicant

activity

(an internal

is

unusual and that
resulted

result

of

in

a

failure) suffered by the

Either theory of Allen amply supports

meaningful

that the

this.

The

the Medical Panel Report was to

find that the December 1985 occurrence

was unrelated

to the

October 1984 industrial accident.
To

determine

otherwise

Workers Compensation
Mabbutt, "the

law.

would
As

defeat

stated

by

the

purpose of

Judge

Allen in

Act would appear to only require that the work

activity were a sufficient precipitating factor resulting" in
this

case

to

a

myocardial

infarction

suffered

by

Applicant.

j/t
DATED this

4V ^day of March, 1988

Attor/iey/for Applicant
Exhibit "G" p. 17
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the

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this

?{ ?v V

day of Marchf 1988 a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Motion for Review to the following, postage prepaid:

Michael Dyer, Esq.
P.O. Box 687
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT

84110

Douglas Olsen
P . O . Box 687
M a n c o s , CO 81328
Wausau I n s u r a n c e
P . O . Box 7400
M u r r a y , UT 84107
Second I n j u r y Fund
P . O . Box 510250
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 8 4 1 5 1 - 0 2 5 0
The o r i g i n a l of the foregoing was hand-delivered to^the I n d u s t r i a l Commission
of Utah t h i s 30th day of March, 1988.
Ttobert^r? Shauojrhessy,
Attorjatey f o r A p p l i c a n t
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step in deciding whether any defendant is
justified under section 76-2-405 is to determine what burden of proof the defendant
and the State are respectively required to
carry. It is impossible to allocate the burden of proof without first determining
whether the defendant is entitled to the
statutory presumption.
In view of the foregoing, we vacate the
trial court's finding of delinquency and remand this case for factual findings as to
whether the entry into RJ2.'s home was
unlawful and forcible, or otherwise qualifies under U.CJL, 1953, § 76-2-405(2) for a
legal presumption of reasonableness, and a
new determination regarding jurisdiction of
the juvenile court based on such findings.
HALL, CJ., STEWART, Associate
C J , and HOWE and ZIMMERMAN,
JJ., concur.

James LANCASTER, Plaintiff,

capricious nor without substantial evidence
to support it
Affirmed.
Stewart Associate CJ., concurred in
the result
1. Workers9 Compensation «»571
Heart attack was by "accident" for
workers* compensation purposes where
there was nothing in claimant's job duties
to suggest he would suffer a heart attack,
nor did he anticipate one, so that it was
"unexpected." U.CJL1953, 85-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Workers' Compensation *>1536
Conclusion of Industrial Commission
that there was no medical causal connection between claimant's work conditions,
during cold weather at high altitude, and
his heart attack, was neither arbitrary or
capricious nor without substantia] evidence
to support it in light of conflicting medical
evidence and facts that claimant was working in a heated backhoe cab, using hydraulically operated controls. U.CJU953, 351-45.

v.
GILBERT DEVELOPMENT, State
Insurance Fund, and the Second
Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 20897.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 20, 1987.

Michael E. Dyer, Stephanie A. Mallory,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Dennis Lloyd, Susan B. Diana, Salt Lake
City, for Stale Ins. Fund.
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for
Second Injury Fund.
DURHAM, Justice:

Workers' compensation benefits for
heart attack that occurred while claimant
was at work were denied by the Industrial
Commission, and claimant sought review.
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that
(1) heart attack was by "accident," but (2)
conclusion that there was no medical causal
connection between work conditions and
the heart attack was neither arbitrary or

The claimant James Lancaster, seeks review of the denial of workers' compensation benefits by the State Industrial Commission for injuries from a heart attack
that occurred while he was clearing snow
with a backhoe at Brian Head Ski Resort
We examine the evidence on this writ of
review to determine if the claimant's heart
attack is the result of an injury "by acri-

of section 7S-3a-16). The findings we arc requiring is this opinion are not jurisdictional
findings, but rather findings relating to the ap»

plication of an affirmative defense to criminal
charges.
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dent arising out of or in the course of his
employment" U.CJL, 1953, § 35-1-45
(Supp.1986). We recently established the
analytical framework for internal injury
cases such as this in Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Using the analysis in Allen, we affirm the
decision of the Industrial Commission.
On February 17,1984, the claimant, aged
43, arrived for work at Brian Head Resort
at his usual hour of 7.-00 a.m* The elevation at Brian Head Resort is approximately
ten thousand feet Claimant's first task
was to clear snow using a backhoe. Although the temperature outside was cold,
the cab of the backhoe was heated. All of
the backhoe controls were hydraulically operated and required no unusual effort to
operate. During the morning's work, the
claimant climbed in and out of the backhoe
two or three times.
The claimant experienced chest pains,
which became more severe as the day pro*
greased. These pains were more severe
than similar pains he had experienced four
days earlier. When the pains became debilitating, he informed his supervisor, who
then called paramedics; the claimant was
transported to a hospital in Cedar City,
Utah. The treating physician determined
that the claimant was suffering from acute
anterior myocardial infarction. After one
week at the hospital, the claimant was released to the care of his personal physician,
Dr. Chanderraj. Although this was the
claimant's first heart atuck, he had several
preexisting risk factors that predisposed
him to heart attacks: a twenty-year smoking history, an elevated serum cholesterol
level, an elevated uric acid level, and borderline diabetes.
On August 10,1984, the Industrial Commission held a hearing in which one doctor,
Dr. Perry, was appointed to a medical panel. A bearing on the medical panel findings was held on March 25,1985. On April
5,1985, the administrative law judge issued
his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order. The administrative law judge reviewed the conflicting medical evidence and
then adopted the medical findings of the

medical panel as his own. The administrative law judge found:
[T]he Applicant's work actyrities*and the
myocardial infarction of [February 17,
1984] do not constitute an injury by accident. The Applicant's heart attack was
unexpected, but there was nothing about
his work activities that could constitute
an unanticipated, unintended occurrence
different from what would normally be
expected to occur in the usual course of
events. His heart attack appears to have
been a mere coincidence, end his work
activities did not contribute significantly
to its occurrence. At best, it is conjectural as to whether it even precipitated his
heart attack, but it clearly was not a
significant precipitating cause. There
was no evidence that the Applicant's
work activities on February 17, 1984
were particularly different from the activities he had been performing for many
weeks prior thereto.
The administrative law judge ultimately denied the claim on the ground that the claimant failed to show that the heart atuck
was "by accident" and that the heart attack was medically caused by an exertion
in the workplace.
Our scope of review of factual findings
in Industrial Commission cases is limited.
We have explained in prior cases:
The reviewing court's inquiry is whether
the Commission's findings are "arbitrary
and capricious" or "wholly without
cause" or contrary to the "one (inevitable] conclusion from the evidence" or
without "any substantial evidence" to
support them. Only then should the
Commission's findings be displaced.
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfrtdi, 631 P.2d
888, 890 (Utah 1981) {quoted in Pittsburgh
Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d
1367, 1370 (Utah 1983), and Sobo's Electronic Service v. Sabof 642 P.2d 722, 725
(Utah 1982)). At the time of his decision,
the administrative law judge did not have
the benefit of our analytical framework for
accident eases involving internal failures
set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Nevertheless, the record is sufficiently developed for
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us to apply Allen to the facts and conclusions in the case before us.
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, we
explained that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, section 3S-1-45, requires proof
that an injury occurred "by accident" and
proof of a causal connection between the
accident and the activities or exertions required in the workplace. 729 P.2d at 18.
The administrative law judge's ruling
shows that he found the evidence insufficient to meet both the accident and the
causation elements.
In Allen, we embraced the definition of
"by accident" first formulated in Purity
Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115
Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). We rejected
the position that an accident requires an
unusual event or occurrence. 729 P.2d at
20. An ordinary or usual exertion is sufficient to meet the "by accident" definition if
"the result of an exertion was different
from what would normally be expected to
occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore by accident." 729 P.2d at 22. The critical factor
when determining whether an incident is
bv accident is unexpectedness. 729 P.2d at
22.
[1] Despite a finding that the heart attack was unexpected, the administrative
law judge concluded there was no accident
primarily because the claimant was undertaking his usual work duties. That conclusion cannot stand in light of the standard
set forth in Allen. Although the claimant
had experienced similar pains four days
earlier, he had not been advised of the
etiology of those pains and he had no forewarning that they would occur again on
February 17. Moreover, there is nothing in
the claimant's job duties to suggest that he
would suffer a heart attack. There is overwhelming evidence that the claimant did
not intend to have a heart attack, nor did
he anticipate one. These factors, taken
together with the finding that the myocardial infarction was the "unexpected" result
of an exertion in the workplace, require the
conclusion that the heart attack was "by
accident."

The next step requires us to analyze the
causal connection between the heart attack
and the working conditions. See Hone v.
Shea, 728 P.2d 1008,1011 (Utah 1*86). We
adopted Professor Larson's two-step causation analysis in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d at 25. In order to meet
the causation requirement, tnere must be
sufficient evidence of legal cause and medical cause. Under the legal cause test, "a
claimant with a preexisting condition must
show that the employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk
he already faced in everyday life because
of his condition." 729 P.2d at 25. When a
claimant has no preexisting risk factors,
any exertion connected with the employment and causally connected with the injury as a matter of medical fact will satisfy
the legal causatun test 729 PJ2d at 26.
In addition to proving legal causation,
the claimant must also prove medical causation. "Under the medical cause test, the
claimant must show . . . that the iTi^ss,
strain or exertion required by his or her
occupation led to the resulting injury or
disability." 729 ?2d at 27.
In this case, the administrative law judge
did not distinguish in his causation analysis
between legal and medical causation.
However, it is clear from the medical testimony and other evidence presented to the
administrative law judge that his decision
was based on the failure to prove medical
causation. Because the result in this case
turns on the issue of medical causation, we
will not examine the issue of legal causation.
[2] The claimant argues that his work
activities in cold weather and at a high
altitude precipitated the myocardial infarction. The medical evidence before the administrative law judge was less than conclusive. The claimant's physician, Dr.
Chandenraj, was the doctor most certain
that the working conditions at Brian Head
contributed to the injury. His opinion,
however, was not unequivocal. He stated
that the altitude, cold, and working conditions "probably" precipitated the heart attack. Dr. Chanderraj answered questions
by the claimant's counsel as follows:
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Q. Let me ask you, Doctor, during all
of the time that Mr. Lancaster has been
your patient, have you had an opportunity to form an opinion as to whether or
not the elevation, the cold, and the working conditions at the time of Mr. Lancaster's myocardial infarction precipitated
that heart attack?
A. This is a very difficult question to
answer because it's a gray area in the
field of cardiology; the exact role of
precipitating factors in producing the
event, but it is well known that high
altitude, where the oxygen content of the
air is low, especially in cold weather, can
induce a myocardial event
Q. Would it be your opinion that the
cold, exposure, and the altitude, and the
work conditions played a significant role
or would be the trigger or the lighting up
process of the myocardial infarction?
A. I think we did go over this. I do
feel it triggered—let me put it another
way. If he had not been working up on
that particular day in the cold atmosphere, operating the heavy equipment,
in spite of having—in spite of five days
history of chest pain, he probably would
not have sustained a myocardial infarction.
Dr. Perry, the chairman of the medical
panel and a cardiologist, testified it was
"likely" that the conditions under which
Mr. I-ancaster was working aggravated his
preexisting heart condition. However, Dr.
Perry also was less than certain about the
causal connection between the work conditions and the myocardial infarction. In his
report to the administrative law judpe, Dr.
Perry identified and ranked the role of
various risk factors, including those associated with work, in precipitating the claimant's myocardial infarction. He stated in
his report;
Mr. Lancaster has mild diabetes mellitus,
smokes cigarettes, has an elevated unc
acid and an elevated serum cholesterol
level, all of which increase risk of coronary artery disease. In very rough
terms the cigarette smoking, diabetes
and high cholesterol approximately each
double the risk of coronary artery disease sucn that with these three plus the

uric acid elevation, his risk for coronary
artery disease is 8-10 times higher than
another male of his same age. From„
information gleaned from the recotds,
summary of testimony and talking to Mr.
Lancaster himself, I did not view his
work as a risk factor for a myocardial
infarction. While it was apparently cold,
he was not involved in any unusual exertion, neither was he subjected to any
unusual stress.
. . . While it is possible the cold exposure and his exertion had a role in precipitating the myocardial infarction, it is my
opinion that is is unlikely they played a
significant role. His 5 days of unstable
angina lead me to believe that the patient
was about to have a myocardial infarction, and the rather moderate amount of
exertion and the length of time spent
working simply offered an appropriate
time and place for this event.
When asked to quantify the contribution
of preexisting risk factors and work
factors to the claimant's myocardial infarction, Dr. Perry assigned a value of 90 percent to preexisting conditions and 10 percent to work conditions. Dr. Perry explained, however, that his assessment of
the factors was "a fairly random guess."
In addition, the State Insurance Fund
had its doctor, Frank Dituri, review the
claimant's medical records. Dr. Dituri
opined that there was no evidence to indicate that the claimant's myocardial infarction was caused by his work or the altitude
and cold at his place of work. Dr. Dituri
concluded, 'The type of work activities described could not precipitate any acute
myocardial infarction." According to Dr.
Dituri, the claimant's injury was "due to
the normal progression of arteriosclerotic
coronary artery disease that had been
present for several years and was due to
such factors as his smoking, his hypercholesterolemia his poorly controlled diabetes
and his prior history of alcohol abuse/'
Thus, although there may have been
some connection between the heart attack
and the cold weather and high altitude, the
evidence of any such connection is inconclusive. Not one of the doctors was willing to
state with medical certainty that the claim-
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ant's injury was caused by work-related statutory authority or rule which property
factors. Thus, there is competent and com- conferred jurisdiction upon appellate court
prehensive medical evidence in the record a& well as other information, will result in
upon which the administrative law judge dismissal of appeal, particularly wbefe eouncould rely in concluding that medical causa- Bel ignores appellate court* request that
don was lacking. Although the medical statement be properly amended. Rules
evidence was conflicting, it is the responsh App.Proc., Rule 9(e).
bility of the administrative law judge to
resolve factual conflicts.
*• Appeal and Error *»784
We hold that the Industrial Commission's
APP^ ^ u i r e d <kmissal where counffled
conclusion that there was no medical causal * *
docketing statement which failed
connection between work conditions and to »»Ply **h requirement that statement
the claimant's heart attack is neither "arbi- •«* ' o r t h **y statutory authority or rult
trarv or capricious" nor "without any sub- w ^ch properly conferred jurisdiction upon
stanual evidence to support it" We there- appellate court Rules AppJProc, Rules 9,
fore affirm the order of the Industrial 9(d).
Commission.
HALL, CJ.f and HOWE and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

LaMar Duncan, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

STEWART, Associate CJ.f concurs in
the result

Linda Wheat Field, Attorney, Dept of
Employment Sec, Salt Like City, for defendants.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and
DAVIDSON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Craig BROOKS, PlaintifT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Board of Review of the Indus*
trial Commission of Utah, Defendants.
No. •60284-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 24, 1987.
After completion of litigation, counsel
for plaintiff petitioned for writ of review.
The Court of Appeals held that appeal required dismissal based upon counsel's filing
of docketing statement which did not comply with rule requiring statements to set
forth statutory authority or rule which
properly conferred jurisdiction upon appellate court
Dismissed.
1. Appeal and Error *»784
Failure of docketing statements to fully comply with rule requiring citation of

PER CURIAM:
(1* 2] In the above case, plaintiffs counsel filed with this Court a "docketing statement" that does not comply with Rule 9 of
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
The statement filed fails to set forth any
statutory authority or rule which properly
confers jurisdiction upon this Court Other
information required by Rule 9 is also lacking and necessary documents are not attached. R. Utah CtApp. 9(d).
Docketing statements must fully comply
with Rule 9. Failure to comply wfll result
in dismissal of the appeal, particularly
when counsel ignores our request that the
statement be properly amended. Grtgory
v. Fourthwtst Investments LUL, 735 P.2d
33 (Utah 1987); R. Utah CtApp. 9(e).
The appeal is dismissed.
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